American foreign policy professionals rarely prioritize Africa in their broader policymaking. When the US government does focus on African affairs, it often does so as a corollary to other global challenges—such as the Global War on Terror or immigration. In the few times the US government has responded to a foreign policy challenge specific to Africa, it has typically done so through either the prism of counterterrorism and security or development and humanitarian assistance. 

    On the development front, the United States has centered much of this policy on the African continent. The US Agency for International Development (USAID), which has served as the primary US federal agency funding global development and humanitarian work since its founding in 1961, has provided life-saving aid to people across Africa, including medical support for those affected by diseases such as HIV/AIDS. Billions of USAID funding has gone to Africa over the period of the agency’s operation. Yet, experts have at times questioned the durability of the benefits these projects have provided. 

    The cyclical nature of Western-funded development projects, which are often managed by US-based implementing partners contracted by USAID or other donors to run these projects, is too short to provide sustainable development. Additionally, these projects sometimes rely on the wrong metrics to judge their success, meaning that they fail to fix the right problems in the right places. Ultimately, these challenges prevent sustainable development from taking hold, thus failing to deliver long-term job and infrastructure benefits that withstand the lifecycle of project grants. 

    On the security front, the United States has committed diplomatic and military resources to respond to the proliferation of armed groups on the continent, particularly concentrated in the Sahel region of Central and West Africa. Over the past two decades, the United States has spent over $3.3 billion on bolstering security in the Sahel.

    Despite committing extensive resources to the cause, the US counterterrorism effort—as well as that of the French—has failed to limit the spread of militant groups. Between 2020 and 2023 alone, eight coup attempts occurred in the Sahel. Meanwhile, armed groups have proliferated and are now spreading further south, threatening the security of countries along Africa’s Atlantic coast. 

    The times, though, are rapidly changing. The United States, like its French ally, has been kicked out from many of the Sahelian countries with which it had formed military relationships. Following its 2023 coup, for example, Niger, a key partner in American and French counterterrorism efforts, demanded the end of American military presence on Nigerien territory. 

    The other major prism of traditional US foreign policy in Africa—development and humanitarian work—is being rapidly eliminated by the Trump administration. Since taking office in January, the president’s team has cut much of USAID’s funding, fired most of the agency’s employees, and ended the agency’s independence by placing it under the State Department’s management, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio now serving as USAID director.

    As the United States shifts away from security and development assistance, President Trump’s team should pivot to focus on deep-rooted American infrastructure investment across the continent. Doing so will connect Africa to global markets and provide avenues through which American companies can sell products and services to new, untapped markets across the world’s fastest-growing continent, thus directly benefiting American economic interests and advancing the president’s goal of increasing American exports and rebalancing US trade. 

    Investing in improved African infrastructure is also an effective way for the United States to respond to the great power competition with China that has come to define much of Washington’s foreign policy in recent years. Centering this inevitable competition not on military might but rather on an economic exchange allows the US-China rivalry to create a kind of market-driven competition that can lead to positive-sum growth and mutual benefits. 

    Given that Africa’s infrastructure needs are substantial, the investment opportunity is considerable. The African Union Development Agency estimates that between $130 and $170 billion is needed annually to build up the continent’s infrastructure. Currently, only about $80 billion is spent each year.

    Although relatively small compared to the continent’s investment needs, the United States began investing in Africa and the Global South in a more focused manner during the Biden years. President Biden’s administration supported and partially funded the Lobito Corridor, a collection of infrastructure projects centered around building a rail line connecting the western Angolan port of Lobito on the Atlantic coast with resource-rich mining towns eastward across Angola, Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with a possible extension all the way to the Tanzanian port city of Dar es Salaam on the Indian Ocean. To enhance the effectiveness of this rail line, the corridor should include feeder roads and other infrastructure, such as solar panel fields, thereby further integrating the region. 

    The construction of Lobito is being managed by the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI), an initiative created and jointly funded by the G7 countries to try to support greater investments across the developing world in response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI has invested over $1 trillion in infrastructure across the world and about $260 billion in Africa since its inception in 2013.

    Another benefit of Lobito is the ability of local towns and villages to engage in the trade of goods and the transportation of people, thereby enhancing the economic integration of these areas.

    Under Biden, US investment in Lobito was primarily made through a combination of grants and loans to private companies provided by various federal agencies, including the Export-Import Bank and the Development Finance Corporation (DFC), which promotes American private sector investment abroad. These financial offerings sought to incentivize investment from private companies that would otherwise struggle to achieve profitability in Africa in the short to medium term. 

    Of course, contributing American capital to projects such as Lobito is not done as a form of charity but rather to help advance American interests. By supporting this infrastructure corridor, the United States government can help improve the logistical access American firms have to resources and minerals in a region rich with some of the world’s most valuable rare-earth minerals. This then allows American companies, especially technology firms that rely on minerals to power batteries, semiconductors, and other technologies, to utilize them in product development and various technologies. 

    The DRC, for example, is the world’s largest source of cobalt, a mineral used in the creation of lithium-ion batteries common in electric vehicles. Copper, used in various infrastructure and engineering applications, is also abundant in the region surrounding the Lobito Corridor.

    For the United States to establish sustainable economic connections with African countries rooted in infrastructure development, it cannot be viewed as a purely extractive partner, as it has been in the past. To build more complex economies that do more than just export primary resources, American companies will need to invest in downstream manufacturing on the continent. 

    A more robust African infrastructure would also have substantial benefits beyond just transporting resources to coastal ports for global trade. A major focus of the World Bank at the recently concluded spring meetings in Washington was on how improved transportation networks could enhance the local African agricultural sector, thus supporting food security needs on the continent. 

    The Trump administration has signaled its intention to continue investing in this infrastructure and transportation corridor. Acting US Ambassador to Angola James Story said in early April that “we are here to show our commitment to these projects.” However, there have been no major announcements about new funding for the project since Trump took office, and there has been no publicly announced diplomatic engagement with the leaders of the corridor’s countries to discuss ways to coordinate this work.

    With the president’s budget proposal requesting an additional $2.8 billion for DFC for the coming fiscal year, there is hope that the administration is interested in continuing the government’s role in facilitating US private sector engagement in low- and middle-income countries. The Trump administration should invest these funds in projects like Lobito’s and similar infrastructure initiatives across Africa. 

    The Trump administration has left the position of Special Coordinator for the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI) vacant. This was a State Department position created by the Biden administration and tasked with leading the United States’ work on PGI projects, including Lobito. Having a single point of contact for PGI supported the Biden team’s effort to propel this infrastructure work forward. Trump should appoint someone with deep-rooted knowledge of infrastructure and development projects across the Global South in this position and empower them to lead America’s global infrastructure portfolio. 

    Another example for the Trump administration to follow as it relates to Western-based investment in Africa is one by the European Union (EU). In 2021, the EU created a comprehensive infrastructure plan for the developing world known as the Global Gateway Investment Package. Although this €300 billion investment plan is international in scope, half of the money is directed toward Africa. 

    The plan aims to consider local African interests when making investments on the continent and outlines how the funds will be allocated to meet the eleven priority areas identified by the African Union (AU) in its Agenda 2063. The agenda outlines Africa’s development and security priorities, aiming to achieve massive improvements in health, infrastructure, and security by 2063. Localizing infrastructure to directly meet the needs of Africans, as outlined by Africans themselves, is the most effective way to ensure long-term buy-in from African governments, which in turn helps advance two-way trade and economic exchange. 

    Ultimately, investing in Africa is a pathway through which the US government can help open new avenues for American producers to sell goods and services to emerging markets on a continent whose population is expected to double by 2050. All the while, building closer economic and trade connections with a continent that’s home to some of the world’s most valuable resources can help American firms access important inputs in product development, supporting American private sector growth and innovation—all music to the president’s ears. 

    At the same time, by connecting Africans to global markets, this investment will help lift people in Africa out of poverty and provide them with greater access to a number of goods and services, which will help fight against food insecurity by building the infrastructure to connect consumers with agricultural producers based both in Africa and elsewhere. As some studies have found, addressing food insecurity challenges can help mitigate the outbreak of war and conflict. 

   Using investment to advance American economic integration is also an appropriate response to China’s massive infrastructure development work centered around the BRI. This type of investment helps enhance American engagement with the world in response to China’s growing economic weight without focusing the competition on increasing military aggression.