by Giorgio Cafiero

    From trade to infrastructure to security, Moscow and Kabul have more than a few interests in common.

    Nearly four years after the Taliban reconquered Afghanistan, numerous countries have diplomatically engaged with the Islamic Emirate, accepting its rule as a political reality. Yet, no government had formally recognized the “Taliban 2.0” until Russia did so on July 3.

    While Russia’s decision marked a major victory for the Kabul regime, exiled Afghan dissidents and human rights advocates strongly criticized Moscow’s move, arguing it risks legitimizing gender apartheid in Afghanistan while dimming prospects for democratic reforms.

    Still, in the face of Afghanistan’s enduring hardships, Russia’s decision may mark the beginning of a new chapter—one in which greater international engagement could help steer the war-torn, impoverished country toward economic revival and enhanced stability.

    The fact that Russia was the first to recognize the Islamic Emirate was unsurprising. Since the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, Russia-Taliban diplomatic engagement has steadily deepened.

    In March 2022, Russia’s Foreign Ministry accredited Taliban envoy Jamal Nasir Gharwal as chargé d’affaires at the Afghan embassy in Moscow, with Gharwal formally assuming control of the mission the following month. This gradual normalization continued with Moscow revoking its terrorist designation of the Taliban in April 2025, paving the way for official recognition earlier this month.

• The Geopolitics of Afghanistan’s Gradual Opening

    Both Moscow and Kabul hope that Russia’s act of recognition will serve as a precedent, prompting a gradual cascade of similar moves by other non-Western nations.

    “The decision to be the first country in the world to recognize the Taliban state was driven by Moscow’s desire to present itself as a leader in the region who is not afraid to set precedents. In this regard, the Kremlin hopes that its decision will be followed by other countries,” Nikita Smagin, an independent expert on Russia’s foreign policy in the Middle East, told this author.

    “There is little doubt that this decision will allow the Taliban-led state to reduce its level of isolation. Likely, there will also be [other] countries that may follow and recognize the Islamic Emirate,” he added.

    Afghan foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi has expressed this desire too. Given the geopolitical and security dynamics in play, it seems realistic to expect a cascade of recognition. The chances are good that the former Soviet republics may be the next to join Russia in recognizing the Taliban.

    All Central Asian republics—even Tajikistan, which has, until recently, long maintained a firmly anti-Taliban stance—appear increasingly poised to follow Moscow’s lead. Since August 2021, these states have closely coordinated with Russia vis-à-vis Afghanistan. Uzbekistan, in particular, has significantly expanded its engagement with post-occupation Afghanistan, investing in infrastructure and economic initiatives, and facilitating dialogue between Kabul and international institutions. Additionally, Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov’s historic August 2024 visit to the Afghan capital underscored Tashkent’s commitment to strong ties with post-occupation Afghanistan.

    China, which has engaged the “Taliban 2.0” since August 2021, stands as a likely contender for formal recognition. However, issues pertaining to Kabul’s tensions with Islamabad and Uyghur militancy complicate the Islamic Emirate’s relationship with Beijing. Meanwhile, other states operating within Russia’s geopolitical orbit, including Belarus, Iran, and North Korea, may now be more inclined to follow suit given Moscow’s move. The same could be said about the Gulf Arab monarchies, especially the United Arab Emirates.

    Afghanistan appears increasingly poised to drift further from the West as Kabul becomes more deeply entrenched within Russia’s geopolitical orbit of influence, possibly making Afghanistan more relevant to East-West geopolitical tensions.

    “Moscow’s move exploits the post-American vacuum, positioning Russia as a power broker in Central Asia while countering Western influence. By recognizing the Taliban, Russia aims to anchor Afghanistan into a Eurasian economic corridor, aligning with its and China’s vision of regional dominance,” Aigerim Turgunbaeva, a Bishkek-based journalist, told this author.

    Moscow’s move may severely diminish the likelihood of Western governments extending similar recognition in the foreseeable future. The arrest warrants recently issued by the International Criminal Court for Taliban Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada and Chief Justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani underscore the West’s reluctance to “legitimize” the regime.

    “There was a status quo in Afghanistan for the last four years, which has now been disrupted. Taliban-ruled Afghanistan has taken a clear shift towards the Russia-China-Iran bloc, and it is certain that there will be a Western reaction to this,” said a former Afghan diplomat who spoke anonymously to this author.

    Dr. Mark Katz, a professor emeritus at George Mason University, believes that Moscow’s recognition of the Islamic Emirate is likely to advance Russia’s strategic messaging across the non-Western world, reinforcing its efforts to differentiate Moscow’s foreign policy from that of Washington and European capitals.

    “While the Taliban’s dreadful treatment of women is likely to prevent western governments from recognizing it, Russia’s having done so will allow Moscow to broadcast the narrative that, unlike the West, Russia ‘does not interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign countries.’ For other governments that do not respect women’s rights, this will be appealing,” he told this author.

    Moscow’s recognition of the Islamic Emirate, against the backdrop of Washington’s lifting of sanctions on Syria’s relatively new Sunni Islamist government, serves as a near-ideal embodiment of the “logic of the Cold War,” Smagin explained.

    “Within this framework, dividing radical Islamists into ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’ becomes a natural pattern of behavior on the international stage. It is likely that we will see many more actions driven by this logic, both from Russia and from other global powers,” he told this author, adding that it reflects Moscow’s growing conviction that stark realpolitik now governs international affairs, where moral considerations have been all but cast aside.

• Opening the Lapis Lazuli Corridor

    The precise trajectory of economic relations between Russia and Afghanistan following Moscow’s recognition of the Taliban remains uncertain. Although it is too early to predict the scale or scope of future commercial engagement, this diplomatic shift may open new trade and investment opportunities for ordinary Afghan citizens living in one of the world’s poorest countries.

    Moscow hopes that its recognition of Afghanistan’s current government will pave the way for Russia to emerge as a key economic partner to Afghanistan, expanding trade in oil, gas, and wheat, while deepening cooperation in infrastructure development, energy production, and agricultural initiatives. Even limited economic cooperation with Russia and, by extension, other countries in the neighborhood could, over time, deliver tangible, if modest, benefits to the Afghan population.

    Russia has long sought to establish a North-South trade corridor traversing both sides of the Caspian Sea, with the aim of accessing Iranian ports and, ultimately, opening up more trade with India. However, last month’s 12-day Iran-Israel war casts fresh uncertainty over this route’s viability, prompting Moscow to explore alternative pathways for regional connectivity.

    Against this backdrop, earlier this month, Afghan officials participated in the Economic Cooperation Organization summit held in Khankendi, Azerbaijan, where they discussed reviving the Lapis Lazuli Corridor—a trade and transit route launched in 2018 that links Afghanistan to Turkey via Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Russia, for its part, has pursued similar efforts for some time.

    “When Afghan media reports on trade with Russia or the Lapis Lazuli Corridor, they’re saying this opens up a whole new trade route for them so they’re not dependent on Pakistan and stuff arriving in Pakistani ports and then coming into Afghanistan. So, for [the Afghans] it does have some significance,” Bruce Pannier, a Turan Research Center fellow and board member of the Caspian Policy Center, told this author.

    “As far as a North-South trade route opening up that will connect Afghanistan with Russia, which could be used to bring Russian goods into Afghanistan, that should help the average Afghan citizen a little bit as far as being able to obtain basic wears and maybe canned food or something like that,” he added.

    Beyond the future of Afghan-Russian economic relations, an overall trend toward recognition on the part of more regional and global powers “could enhance Afghanistan’s economic prospects by increasing trade and investment, particularly in infrastructure projects like the Trans-Afghan railway or TAPI pipeline, which connect Central Asia to South Asia,” suggested Turgunbaeva.

• Eyes on ISKP

    Despite its seclusion on the international stage, the Taliban has managed to establish a degree of internal stability in Afghanistan. Yet significant challenges persist, not least the continued presence of active Islamic State cells across the country. By recognizing the Taliban, Russia aims to anchor stability in Afghanistan amid the threat of Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP).

    Counterterrorism tops Moscow’s agenda, with the Kremlin increasingly casting the Taliban as a critical partner in the struggle against a group that poses a direct threat to Russia and Central Asian countries. Many militants from Central Asia—particularly from groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan—have joined ISKP. Unsurprisingly, Moscow is also deepening cooperation with Tashkent and other regional capitals to counter the group.

    While Moscow’s recognition of the Islamic Emirate alone is unlikely to produce a decisive shift, broader regional recognition—including from neighboring Central Asian states and China—could, over time, contribute to a more secure and consolidated internal landscape. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that Russia’s recognition could prompt Central Asian republics and Beijing to extend counterterrorism support—potentially including arms—to Kabul, ultimately bolstering the Taliban’s capacity to eradicate ISKP.

    “The Taliban would welcome any help that goes toward eliminating this group and preventing them from causing any more problems, including the violence that they’ve committed on Afghan citizens,” Pannier told this author.

    President Vladimir Putin has even labeled the Taliban an “ally” in the fight against ISKP. There is an ideological factor to consider. As Russia and former Soviet republics in Central Asia see it, Salafist jihadist groups, chiefly ISKP, are likely to remain a serious threat throughout the future. But the Taliban’s brand of Deobandism, understood as an inward-facing orthodoxy, lacks influence outside of Afghanistan. Put simply, the leaders in Moscow and Central Asian capitals do not see the Taliban threatening their countries’ security.

    “The biggest threat for Russia out of Afghanistan is the spread of Salafist groups through ISKP, as Salafism is more widespread in Central Asia. Meanwhile the Taliban’s sect of Deobandism is not widespread in Central Asia,” noted the former Afghan diplomat. “As a result, in this religious struggle between Deobandism and Salafism that is playing out in Afghanistan, Russia may perceive the Taliban as an asset to keep Salafism [in] check and prevent [Salafist groups] from spreading further into Central Asia,” he added.

• A New Path Forward

    The Taliban’s human rights record and violent usurpation of Afghanistan’s government make the recognition debate controversial. Yet, non-recognition has exacerbated hardships faced by ordinary Afghans—most of whom are not responsible for their government’s draconian policies—while yielding no meaningful progress on human rights.

    Although Russia’s own strategic interests drove it to recognize the Taliban, Moscow’s move may nonetheless reduce Afghanistan’s international isolation and help the country re-engage with the world. If so, the Afghan people, after decades of war and suffering, could hopefully glimpse the prospect of a more stable and prosperous future.