National Interest

by J. James Kim

    The US alliance with South Korea has been an outstanding success for American foreign policy. Presidents Trump and Lee should keep it that way.

    While the media is busy weighing in on the agenda for the first summit between US president Donald Trump and South Korean president Lee Jae Myung on August 25, the latter’s office announced that the focus of the “official working visit” would be on a vision for a “future-oriented, comprehensive strategic alliance.” This will include: fleshing out the July trade deal, enhancing the joint defense posture, broadening and strengthening coordination in technology and innovation and denuclearizing North Korea while strengthening regional deterrence.

    These agenda items can be grouped into two categories that encompass the economic implications of the recently announced tariff deal and the strategic considerations of force posture on the Korean Peninsula.

    Many observers appear concerned about the latter, given months of speculation about the Trump administration’s emphasis on “alliance modernization” and pending adjustments to global US force posture. While changes in force posture have been suggested since the Bush era, recent developments are part of a broader strategy to address the “pacing challenge” posed by the emergence of “near-peer rivals” like Russia and China. In particular, the United States needs a more distributed and dispersed force presence in the Indo-Pacific, which can respond more flexibly across air, land, sea and cyberspace.

    The accelerated defense policy changes under the Trump administration in recent months suggest that meaningful changes on this front will likely include a dispersed military presence on islands near the South China Sea and the deployment of tactical long-range strike capabilities. For the Republic of Korea, this translates to deepening the strategic flexibility of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) with possible adjustments to force structure on the Korean Peninsula.

    While the outcome of the summit will be important, look for potential post-meeting developments on matters such as wartime operational control (OPCON) transfer, levels of defense spending and adjustments to USFK force structure and capabilities.

    The Korean response to these changes may be mixed, as the previous conservative administration in Seoul maintained a more nuanced and cautious approach to this issue. However, to the extent that alliance modernization is an adaptive response to the evolving regional security environment, as described by USFK commander General Xavier Brunson, it would be less productive to resist these changes than to utilize the opportunity to enhance the relationship. Recent developments on the economic front can be the basis for this type of constructive approach.

    Although President Trump is likely to seek assurances from his counterpart about the $350 billion Korean investment commitment from the recent deal, the more important question is how targeted these investments will be in sectors of critical importance to both the US and South Korean national interests. In particular, the Republic of Korea and the United States have a history of cooperation in critical and emerging technologies, which can be traced back to the first Trump administration when Samsung first announced the expansion of its semiconductor fabrication facility in Texas.

    The countries made significant strides in 2023 when the two countries agreed to expand coordination on semiconductor supply chains and technology, biotechnology, batteries and clean energy, quantum computing, digital connectivity, artificial intelligence and the defense industry under the banner of US-ROK Next Generation Critical and Emerging Technologies (CET) Dialogue.

    This effort continued during the Japan-ROK-US trilateral summit at Camp David, which highlighted continuing cooperation on “supply chain resilience, particularly on semiconductors and batteries, as well as on technology security and standards, clean energy and energy security, biotechnology, critical minerals, pharmaceuticals, AI, quantum computing and scientific research.”

    The upcoming Trump-Lee Summit could mark the beginning of the next chapter in the US-ROK Technology Innovation Alliance, which can leverage investment commitments to intensify cooperative synergy in areas of relative strength for both countries. Of the twelve strategic technologies identified by the South Korean government, for instance, most immediate benefits and payoffs can come from a more narrowly focused effort on semiconductor production, AI, nuclear energy, biopharmaceuticals, aerospace and marine, robotics and next-generation communications.

    These are areas where both countries have demonstrated leadership and can benefit by playing to their strengths. For instance, the South Korea’s hardware and manufacturing capacity in chips, defense manufacturing, shipbuilding, nuclear energy, information and communication technology and robotics can be coupled with US leadership in AI research and development and software, aerospace, biopharmaceuticals, cybersecurity, fintech and quantum computing to build a more resilient supply chain and compete against China.

    The US-South Korean alliance has always been the poster child of a successful US foreign policy in the postwar era. It exemplifies how shared values, mutual trust and effective deterrence, achieved through partnership with the United States, can foster regional peace, stability, democracy and prosperity. There are always risks implicit in changing something that has worked well in the past, but the summit on August 25 can also be a prologue to a new chapter in the relationship if the leaders seize the moment.

    If done properly, President Trump and President Lee can usher in a new era of a forward-looking, comprehensive and strategic alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea, one that is fit to meet the changing needs of a rapidly evolving security and economic environment.