National Interest

by Antonia-Laura Pup

    While Beijing supports Moscow’s war, it is also preparing to use Ukrainian reconstruction as a means of advancing its economic interests in Europe.

    While the Trump administration is focused on bringing the war in Ukraine to an end, China is both supporting the Kremlin’s war and eyeing Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction. Preventing China’s involvement in Ukraine’s economic and security future is imperative for keeping the European theater of operations stable and free from further Russia-China alignment.

    In contrast to Beijing’s official stance as a responsible member of the United Nations Security Council, China is the main enabler of Russia’s war machine. Just 20 days before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin inked their “no-limits” strategic partnership. Three years later, the growth of their bilateral ties is readily apparent.

    China supplies Russia with vital parts for its fighter jets and drone production. Beijing provides critical support to Russia’s defense industrial base, transferring dual-use materials that Moscow uses to produce weapons. The two countries have also conducted dozens of joint military exercises since February 2022.

    China is now Russia’s largest customer of fossil fuels, purchasing billions of dollars’ worth of crude oil, coal and other energy products each month. On the margins of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit last month, China and Russia signed a major energy agreement to build the new Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline. Beijing has also been instrumental in aiding Russia’s sanctions evasion. Chinese vessels were spotted docked in Russian-occupied Crimea last month and tankers carrying liquefied natural gas from sanctioned Russian projects are docking at Chinese terminals.

    China is supporting the Russian war effort because it benefits Beijing. The Chinese foreign minister reportedly told EU officials this summer that China cannot afford a Russian defeat in Ukraine, as this would allow the United States to prioritize engagement in the Indo-Pacific.

    At the same time, China wants Ukraine to become a new hub for its Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing has put forward its own peace plan—a plan praised by Russia’s foreign minister Sergei Lavrov as the most reasonable option on the table. In this plan, China highlighted its willingness to assist in rebuilding the post-war security architecture. In appreciation for China’s backing of Russia’s war machine, Lavrov called for including China as a Ukrainian security guarantor, along with the rest of the permanent UN Security Council states.

    At the same time, Beijing is courting Kyiv. In August, for the first time since Ukraine gained its independence from the Soviet Union, Xi Jinping sent an Independence Day greeting to Kyiv. In March 2025, China’s development agency announced it is ready to provide aid for the reconstruction process in Ukraine. That same month, Ukraine and China signed new trade agreements to open the Chinese market to Ukrainian agricultural products.

    Beijing’s overtures to Ukraine come against the backdrop of strategic investments to consolidate China’s presence in the Black Sea region. China is set to build a massive port project in Anaklia, Georgia, following the establishment of the strategic partnership between Tbilisi and Beijing. Turkey is also a beneficiary of Chinese strategic investments, particularly in the energy sector.

    If peace in Ukraine leads to the expansion of the Belt and Road in terms of energy, telecom and transportation systems across the continent, the result would leave Europe dependent on another authoritarian actor. Furthermore, NATO’s Secretary General warned that Russia might be ready to use force against European allies again within five years. If Beijing’s investments in European critical infrastructure go unchecked, China would be in a position to exploit the leverage it has over the very European critical infrastructure necessary for NATO’s battle plans against Russia.

    The United States should take seriously the threat that China may use Ukraine’s reconstruction as a platform for the Belt and Road Initiative and equip Kyiv with the necessary tools to counter it. First, the United States should help Ukraine develop its own foreign investment screening mechanism, modeled after the American Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The federal government should train Ukrainian economic security specialists so that its new investment screening mechanism can become a hub for combating investments coming from authoritarian countries.

    Second, the United States should collaborate with regional allies, such as Romania, Moldova, Poland and the Baltic states, to establish an “economic security shield” in Eastern Europe that would prevent the further expansion of China’s strategic investments on the eastern flank of NATO. This shield would allow countries in this region to coordinate their foreign investment screening mechanisms and share economic intelligence on threats coming from Russia and China. Romania has already operationalized a foreign investment screening committee, which is modeled after the American CFIUS.

    Finally, the United States should continue to work both bilaterally and multilaterally, using formats like the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), a political forum for advancing interconnectivity in the Central and Eastern European region where the United States is a strategic partner, to raise political awareness regarding China’s malicious behavior. 3SI could serve not only as a tool for financing interconnectivity projects in this region to strengthen the North-South European corridor, but also as a platform to steer a common position regarding the need to thwart Chinese investments in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans.

    Thwarting China’s involvement in Ukraine’s reconstruction is a strategic imperative for the United States and its European allies. Recognizing this imperative is relevant not only to maintain our competitiveness in the context of great power competition but also to preserve the rules-based international order. China should not be allowed to both enable the Russian aggression that has destroyed Ukraine’s infrastructure and industry and then be allowed to profit, financially and diplomatically, from its reconstruction.