National Interest

by Anushka Saxena

    The investigation into one of China’s top generals is the latest episode in Xi Jinping’s purge of the People’s Liberation Army.

    On January 20, 2026, at a high-level study session for China’s principal provincial and ministerial officials, there was a conspicuous empty chair. Official reporting surreptitiously noted that “both” Vice-Chairmen of the Central Military Commission (CMC) were in attendance, yet the footage told a different story. General Zhang Youxia, the second-in-command of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), was missing.

    Four days later, the other shoe dropped. China’s Ministry of National Defense confirmed that Zhang, alongside CMC member and Chief of Joint Staff Liu Zhenli, had been placed under investigation for “serious violations of discipline and law.” While Beijing is no stranger to either military corruption or political indiscipline, Zhang’s case is much more incendiary than business-as-usual.

    Since 2023, the PLA has been in a state of perpetual churn. What began in July 2023, when the CMC Equipment Development Department (EDD) called for whistleblowers to report corrupt procurement practices dating back to 2017, first resulted in the targeting of relatively replaceable officials—Defense Minister Li Shangfu and PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) Commander Li Yuchao. But the crisis soon metastasized—in late 2025, the purge swept through the so-called “Fujian gang.” These are officials like CMC vice chairman He Weidong and Admiral Miao Hua, who rose through the ranks of the erstwhile 31st Group Army in Fujian and the PLA Navy.

    For a moment, it appeared that Zhang Youxia—a veteran of the ground forces with deep roots in a rival “Shaanxi gang”—was the victor in this infighting. He likely facilitated the takedown of the Fujian clique, perhaps viewing their dominance over both the defence budget and military strategy as a threat to his personal ambitions and his beloved Army. It seemed natural that Zhang, along with the then discipline czar Zhang Shengmin, was wielding the hammer for Chinese president Xi Jinping.

    So, why turn on Zhang now  The reasons are likely a deadly cocktail and one may never know entirely what really went on behind the scenes. And yet, it is fair to reason with a few assumptions.

    Firstly, Zhang headed the EDD before Li Shangfu. If Li was guilty of massive corruption, Zhang was either complicit or deliberately blind. Promoting a close aide like Li to the post of defense minister, who turned out to be a liability due to his corruption in his tenure as EDD head, is an unforgivable failure of judgment for an army planning to become a force of “world-class” warfighters. This is especially important given that Li’s mismanagement of the EDD was likely a crucial factor in triggering a series of investigations and purges within the PLARF and across defence SOEs.

    Related to this problem is the question of tactical divergence. As the PLA pivots heavily toward naval and missile capabilities in preparation for a Taiwan scenario, Zhang’s background in the PLA Ground Forces, or his experience in the gruesome Vietnam War, could have put him at odds with Xi’s modernization goals.

    Perhaps most importantly, there is the personal angle—and personal is political. Zhang and Xi go back to a time when their fathers were revolutionaries together. But in China’s current political climate, Zhang attempting to challenge Xi, either by dismantling a faction of Taiwan-oriented senior officials, or by breeding political influence and hiding corruption, would not bode well with the “chairman of everything.”

    Xi has rarely responded positively to alternative centers of power. And Zhang’s likely lack of subservience is also evident in the People’s Daily charge-sheet. It accuses Zhang of “trampling on” the CMC chairman’s “responsibility system” and the Party’s absolute leadership over the military. Not to mention, his case is being tried directly by the CPC Central Committee and not the CCDI.

    The consequences of this decapitation are severe. The CMC is now the smallest it has ever been. With the pending removal of Zhang and Liu Zhenli and the declared removal of He Weidong and Miao Hua, the supreme military council is effectively hollowed out.

    Furthermore, the purges are creating a vacuum of experience. Of the 81 generals promoted by Xi in the PLA since October 2022, at least 14 have been purged and 23 have effectively vanished. This creates a “Schrodinger’s general” problem, wherein officers who are technically in command have either disappeared from public view or are paralyzed by the fear of being targeted next.

    That, combined with the rapid turnover of commanders in the Northern, Southern and Central Theaters, as well as in services such as the PLA Army, Air Force and Rocket Force, is likely to degrade morale and steadiness in the chain of command.

    Also likely is that Zhang’s extensive networks come under the radar. Officials like Northern Theater Commander Huang Ming and Southern Theater Commander Wu Yanan, who share career overlaps with Zhang in the old Shenyang Military Region, must now be looking over their shoulders. Officials such as Fan Yonxiang, Director of the CMC General Office, also worked with Zhang during Zhang’s tenure as Head of the PLA General Armaments Department in 2015. While these networks merit deeper investigation, Xi’s choice boils down to decimating anyone who ever worked under Zhang’s patronage or retaining experienced personnel within the force.

    As Beijing approaches the “Two Sessions” in March, one will likely see new appointments and the house of cards will be rebuilt out of a deck of Xi’s self-selected, self-promoted loyalists. But new names cannot mask the reality that the PLA’s goal to become a world-class military in the next few years will face short-term hindrances.

    Instead, Xi now has a high command consumed by paranoia, where war planning takes a backseat to political survival. Flybys around Taiwan, or skirmishes with the Philippines in the South China Sea, will continue. But while Xi caged the tigers, he must hope that he has not declawed the dragon in the process.