America First Comes to the South Caucasus

American Thinker

 

by Den Kalmyk

    Vice President JD Vance’s recent visit to Armenia and Azerbaijan was more than diplomatic choreography. It was a strategic re-entry into a region Washington neglected for too long, and one that now sits squarely inside the map of great-power competition.

    For years, the South Caucasus was treated as peripheral. Russia acted as security arbiter. Turkey expanded its political footprint. China quietly embedded itself through infrastructure projects, energy partnerships, and logistics investments tied to the Belt and Road Initiative.

    Today, China is the largest trading partner of more than 120 countries worldwide. Its economic reach extends deep into Central Asia and the Caspian basin. Azerbaijan has elevated its relationship with Beijing to what China calls a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” its highest bilateral designation. Chinese firms are active in transport infrastructure, petrochemicals, renewables, and logistics across the region.

    In short, others recognized the corridor’s importance long before Washington did. Vance’s visit signals a correction.

    At the center of the administration’s effort is the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) — a connectivity initiative aimed at strengthening trade routes across the South Caucasus and reducing dependence on Russian and Iranian transit corridors.

    Trade routes always shape influence. Whoever helps build the corridor often shapes its political orientation.

    The South Caucasus is a geographic hinge linking Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Currently, Azerbaijan alone exports roughly 400,000 barrels of oil per day and supplies natural gas to several European states. Caspian energy already helps diversify Europe away from Russian supply. That alone gives the region strategic weight. But energy is only part of the equation.

    In a world where roughly one-third of global maritime trade passes through the South China Sea, diversified overland routes are strategic insurance. The more transit alternatives the United States and its partners possess, the less leverage hostile actors can exert.

    TRIPP offers the United States an opportunity to position itself inside that emerging architecture. American companies excel in logistics systems, digital trade platforms, infrastructure security, and energy services. A commercially integrated South Caucasus corridor could expand U.S. private-sector presence while reinforcing Western standards in transit and trade. That is the real benefit of Vance’s visit: repositioning the United States from observer to participant. The broader context makes the timing even more important.

    Russia’s influence in the region, while still present, has been strained by its war in Ukraine. Regional actors are recalculating their dependencies. China continues to expand its economic footprint but prefers environments where American competition is minimal.

    Just as significant, the internal balance of the region is shifting. Armenia, long heavily dependent on Moscow for security guarantees, has begun signaling a willingness to diversify its foreign policy. Yerevan has expanded dialogue with the European Union, increased engagement with Western partners, and publicly questioned the reliability of Russian guarantees after Moscow’s muted responses to recent crises.

    That recalibration creates opportunity. A South Caucasus in which both Armenia and Azerbaijan maintain meaningful Western engagement reduces the likelihood that the region reverts to exclusive Russian dominance. It also creates space for economic integration that is not dictated by Moscow or Beijing. That is why American involvement now carries weight beyond symbolism.

    Vance’s trip reflects an understanding that economic statecraft is central to strategic competition. Instead of defaulting to security commitments or rhetorical positioning, the administration is advancing a model rooted in trade, infrastructure alignment, and commercial access.

    That approach is consistent with the 2025 National Security Strategy’s emphasis on economic security and supply-chain resilience. The $30 trillion U.S. economy depends on stable, diversified trade routes. Protecting those routes does not require military entanglement; it requires strategic positioning.

    Of course, engagement must be disciplined. Azerbaijan practices multi-vector diplomacy, balancing relations with Moscow, Ankara, Beijing, and Washington. That is pragmatic behavior for a mid-sized state in a contested region. But Washington should approach such engagement with realism.

    This is why preserving calibrated leverage remains prudent. Existing statutory frameworks, including Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, reflect congressional intent that U.S. assistance be linked to stability and restraint. Such guardrails do not obstruct engagement; they reinforce it by ensuring American involvement remains purposeful.

    Section 907, in particular, serves as a low-cost instrument of strategic discipline. It does not block trade, prevent diplomatic engagement or foreclose cooperation on connectivity projects like TRIPP. What it does is preserve the principle that U.S. assistance carries expectations. In a region where political alignments shift quickly and external powers compete for influence, maintaining conditionality strengthens Washington’s hand.

    If the United States is going to invest economic capital in shaping a transit corridor of growing importance, it should also preserve the tools that encourage restraint and stability. Removing leverage in the name of optimism rarely produces influence. Preserving it, by contrast, ensures that American engagement remains anchored to long-term interests.

    The core story, however, is not about restrictions. It is about opportunity. For Armenia, U.S. engagement offers diversification beyond near-total dependence on Russia. For Azerbaijan, it offers expanded trade routes and integration into Western-linked economic networks. For the United States, it offers something more durable: a strategic foothold in a transit zone connecting major economic regions at a moment when global supply chains are being restructured.

    Influence in the 21st century is increasingly built through economic architecture. Transit corridors, digital infrastructure, and energy networks create long-term leverage. If the United States is absent from those systems, others will set the standards and shape the incentives.

    The South Caucasus is entering a transitional phase. Russian dominance is no longer absolute, Chinese expansion is accelerating but not uncontested. Regional leaders are recalibrating their options. In that environment, American engagement can shape outcomes — if it is sustained and disciplined.

    TRIPP should be treated as a strategic infrastructure policy. It offers the United States a chance to expand commercial access, strengthen supply-chain resilience, and compete economically without overextension. Vice President Vance’s visit marks a recognition that even regions once dismissed as peripheral can influence global resilience. The United States has now repositioned itself in the South Caucasus. If Washington follows through with clarity and consistency, this opening could translate into measurable economic and strategic gains.

    Den Kalmyk, Ph.D., is an expert on the post-Soviet space and a senior lecturer at the Central European University (CEU) in Budapest. Contributor to The Washington Times, Stars and Stripes, and American Thinker

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