National Interest

by Paul J. Saunders and Martha Miller

    Undersea cables in the Baltic region are vital to energy, technology and economic stability, but are increasingly vulnerable to disruption, sabotage and geopolitical pressure.

<a href="https://rss.com/podcasts/three-questions/2569471">Sabotage Below the Waves (w/ Martha Miller)</a>

    In this episode of Three Questions, Paul Saunders is joined by Martha Miller, a senior fellow for alliances and emerging threats at the Center for the National Interest, to examine a subject that underpins modern economies: undersea infrastructure in the Baltic region.

    The Baltic region hosts a dense network of subsea telecommunications cables, electricity interconnectors and gas pipelines. Fiber-optic cables carry the majority of global internet traffic, including financial transactions and business communications; power cables link national grids, helping countries balance supply and trade electricity; and gas pipelines have long been central to Europe’s energy system—and, in recent years, to its geopolitics.

    This infrastructure helps to form the backbone of regional energy security, digital connectivity and economic stability.

    The region sits at a crossroads between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russia and since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Finland and Sweden have joined the NATO alliance, changing regional dynamics. Within this environment, the number of incidents involving damage to underwater cables has risen. While some of the incidents are a direct result of maritime activity, others, particularly those linked to shadow fleets, have raised questions about deliberate disruption.

    The implications of these incidents extend beyond the region and the European continent. Disruptions to critical infrastructure impact insurance markets, energy prices and data flows globally. Thus, subsea infrastructure has become a more prominent consideration in national security planning.

    This episode explores how national governments, NATO and the private sector—which owns much of the infrastructure—can monitor, protect and repair these assets. From improving anomaly detection to building redundancy into cable networks and increasing the United States’ shipbuilding capacity to enable repairs, resilience requires layered cooperation and prioritization.