National Interest

by James Holmes

There is little doubt the United States can achieve its tactical objectives against Iran through military force—but what if doing so leads to strategic calamity elsewhere in the world

    King Pyrrhus of Epirus, meet Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz would rebuke you for constantly doubling down on warfare—to your kingdom’s ruin.

    Cultural fluency is critical to strategic deliberations and indeed to ordinary conversation. So it seemed fitting to review the concept of a “pyrrhic victory” the other night in seminar. The phrase came up while we were debating the origins, course and outcomes of the Korean War. A pyrrhic victory exhausts the victor’s martial resources, bringing about eventual defeat if not downfall. So wise leaders think beyond immediate results from the battlefield. They strive to improve the state of peace with as little fighting as possible. They dole out resources like a miser.

    Korea was not a pyrrhic victory for the United States, which intervened on South Korea’s behalf after rallying a UN-sanctioned coalition. But it could have been. No nation can do everything. Draining its resources to pursue an outright victory on the Korean Peninsula could have cost the United States its ability to compete and win in the theater that mattered most to Americans during the Cold War—namely Western Europe. Resources are finite for the greatest of great powers. It is pivotal for even a superpower to husband resources for what matters most.

    Burdensome direct costs and opportunity costs accompany constant warfare. That’s why Clausewitz admonishes political and military leaders to concentrate on what matters most. They should forego any secondary commitment unless it promises exceptional reward and unless it will not place the nation’s major commitments in jeopardy. Prudent leaders divert resources to secondary commitments only if they enjoy “decisively superior” resources for discharging primary missions—and can spare a “disposal” force without undue risk.

    It makes no sense to hazard what matters most for something that matters less. Large-scale defeat is an intolerable opportunity cost.

• Pyrrhus of Epirus Never Learned When to Stop Fighting

    Sensible strategy was lost on Pyrrhus. In fact, the life of the 3rd-century-BC king of Epirus, in northwestern Greece, doubles as a parable on the wages of strategic indiscipline. Generalship is more than raw ability. Fellow soldiers esteemed Pyrrhus. Indeed, Plutarch, to my mind history’s best biographer, recalls that the Carthaginian warlord Hannibal—himself rated among history’s ablest captains of arms—exalted Pyrrhus as “the foremost of all generals in experience and ability.”

    This is hefty acclaim. Hannibal implied that Pyrrhus was greater even than Alexander the Great. Hannibal, who harried Rome for 17 years on Italian soil, deemed himself the third-best commander of the age, following Scipio Africanus, the Roman general who smashed Hannibal’s army in North Africa to close out Rome’s second titanic war against Carthage.

    Yet despite his battlefield genius, Pyrrhus never knew when to consolidate his gains or cut his losses. His approach was all offense, all the time. Win or lose in some campaign, Pyrrhus flung his army into some new theater or campaign, usually against the Roman Republic. Over time he bled his army and country dry through ceaseless soldiering. After clashing with Roman armies at the Battle of Asculum (279 B.C.), he retorted to a comrade’s congratulations:

    “If we are victorious in one more battle with the Romans, we shall be utterly ruined.”

    Asculum was the first “pyrrhic victory” known by that name and served as a template for those that followed. As Clausewitz would opine, it is possible to lose strategically while winning operationally and tactically. Pyrrhus confronted a foe that could replenish its strength more readily than his own host could. Strategic victory went to the contestant better able to regenerate combat power. Roman legions boasted superior reserve strength and could make up heavy losses, where Pyrrhus’ army could not.

    The phrase “pyrrhic victory,” accordingly, has come to be shorthand for a tactical success that bankrupts the realm’s resources and sets back its cause strategically and politically. Strategist Edward Luttwak calls the tendency to overextend and expose oneself to defeat an ironic “reversal” of fortune. Strategic leaders must attune themselves to the rhythms of the battlefield. This is doubly important when combat operations span multiple theaters.

    Otherwise commitments may outrun resources to catastrophic effect—as they did for the king of Epirus.

    In short, strategists must guard against the human proclivity to double down. They must cultivate a balanced temperament. Boldness is a virtue on dusty battlegrounds, while an overabundance of skepticism toward new undertakings could beget unduly timid strategy. The virtue to inculcate is introspection. Commanders and political chieftains must concentrate on efforts that matter most while carefully weighing the feasibility, costs, opportunity costs and perils of fresh efforts that could detract from strategic and political success.

    This is a lesson from Greek antiquity, courtesy of Plutarch and filtered through Clausewitz.

• All Armies Must Set Priorities—Including America’s

    And it’s one contemporary political and military overseers should bear constantly in mind. According to strategy documents out of the White House and Pentagon, the Middle East ranks fourth on America’s list of regional priorities, behind the Western Hemisphere, the Indo-Pacific and Europe. Yet the US armed forces are currently expending munitions at a rapid rate in that fourth-ranked theater. The differential equation between expenditure and production of such high-end armaments as Tomahawk cruise missiles is alarming.

    With a showdown with China in the Taiwan Strait supposedly looming as soon as next year, it’s doubtful that defense firms will be able to fully replenish shortfalls in the arsenal in time. Triumph in the Persian Gulf would certainly be pyrrhic if it meant defeat in the Western Pacific for want of weapons.

    Heed the wisdom of the classics.