National Interest

by Matthew Reisener

    The risks of a Cuban regime-change operation far exceed the potential benefits.

    Is Cuba the next country the Trump administration will target for regime change  In the wake of America’s recent arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and support for Israel’s assassination of Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, many experts are questioning whether the White House has similar ambitions in Cuba. President Donald Trump’s statements that“Cuba’s next” and that he hopes to have the“honor” of “taking Cuba” certainly support this perspective, as have his moves to blockade oil and gas shipments to Cuba, impose sanctions against companies doing business with Cuba and issue an indictment against former leader Raúl Castro. Additionally, America has increased the number of intelligence-gathering flights taking place near Cuba—an action which similarly occurred in the lead-up to America’s military interventions in Venezuela and Iran.

    Cuba has long been a source of fascination and frustration for the United States. Cuba emerged as a key regional ally for the Soviet Union during the Cold War, providing valuable intelligence and serving as a bridge between the USSR and Latin American revolutionaries. Since then, Cuba’s anti-American posture, long history of repression and human rights abuses and the high number of Cuban expatriates who sought refuge in the United States have created the image of Cuba as a Caribbean bogeyman—a monster lying in wait just 90 miles off the coast of Florida.

    America continues to view Cuba as a significant danger. In January, the White House stated that Cuba poses an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to America and that its government “aligns itself with—and provides support for—numerous hostile countries, transnational terrorist groups and malign actors adverse to the United States.” The Trump administration has raised concerns about the presence of Chinese and Russian electronic eavesdropping facilities on the island and Cuba’s acquisition of over 300 military drones, which could be used against American targets. Some experts and policymakers have questioned whether the White House intends to use these perceived security threats as the pretext for a military campaign against Cuba.

    While it is unclear whether the Trump administration will seek regime change in Havana, it is apparent that Cuba no longer poses a significant security risk to the United States. Instead, rhetoric that casts Cuba as an ongoing threat reflects outdated Cold War-era thinking and does not match the reality on the ground.

    Once one of Latin America’s most influential and militarily capable countries, Cuba’s regional stature has been significantly diminished in recent years. During the Cold War, Cuba fomented unrest throughout Latin America by supporting revolutionary movements, arming and training guerrilla forces and forging alliances with regional socialist governments. However, Cuba presently plays a much smaller role in regional politics, with the radical groups it once supported having been dissolved or converted into legitimate political parties and many of its longstanding allies (Venezuela’s Maduro and Bolivia’s Evo Morales) having been ousted in recent years.

    Similarly, Cuba’s military ties to both China and Russia are more symbolic than strategic and while the presence of foreign spies in Cuba is not ideal, the island has hosted foreign intelligence bases off and on for over 60 years without America’s national security being meaningfully compromised.

    The White House also claims that “Cuba welcomes transnational terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah and Hamas,” helping these groups “attempt to destabilize the Western Hemisphere.” However, terrorism experts overwhelmingly argue that Cuba has not provided resources to regional extremist groups since the mid-1990s and there is no evidence that Middle Eastern terror groups have ever used Cuba as a base of operations or meaningfully coordinated with the Cuban government against them. Accordingly, the White House’s 2025reinstatement of Cuba’s State Sponsor of Terror designation should be read more as a statement of the administration’s opposition to the Cuban government rather than an accurate reflection of its malign activities.

    Finally, Cuba’s armed forces have been substantially weakened. Once boasting over 200,000 soldiers, Cuba now has only 40,000–45,000 troops and many of its Cold War-era defense platforms are suspected to be inoperable. Cuba’s military decline is attributable not only to the reduction of foreign support following the USSR’s collapse, but also to Cuba’s struggles to fund its armed forces. Embargoed by the United States since 1960, Cuba’s fragile economy has been devastated by America’s ongoing fuel blockade and the cessation of cheap Venezuelan oil imports following Maduro’s arrest.

    Cuba’s oil and diesel reserves are reportedly exhausted and parts of the country experience up to 20 hours of blackouts daily. The US Navy has bolstered its strength in the Caribbean in recent months, punctuated by the arrival of the USS Nimitz carrier strike group in May. The Navy would likely have little trouble overwhelming Cuba’s air and sea defenses in the event of a conflict and Cuba certainly lacks the capability to adequately defend itself if it ever used its drone arsenal to attack the United States.

    While Cuba may not pose an imminent security threat to America, its weakness should not be read as a sign that regime change efforts would necessarily go smoothly. Cuba has long operated under a defense doctrine known as the “War of All the People,” under which the country would mobilize its citizenry to wage guerrilla warfare against invaders. An American campaign against Cuba, particularly one involving ground troops, is unlikely to be met with local support, given the decades of anti-American sentiments engendered by the embargo and regime-sponsored propaganda.

    As they did in Venezuela, American special forces could potentially execute a snatch-and-grab of Raúl Castro or Cuban president Miguel Díaz-Canel to force regime change without committing to a broader conflict. However, the regime would likely survive the capture of any given leader, as Cuba’s government has become significantly less dependent on a unitary executive than it was during the peak of Fidel Castro’s power. While the Trump administration has reportedly sought to identify a “Cuban Delcy” to follow in the footsteps of acting Venezuelan President Delcy Rodriguez and maintain order post-regime change while strengthening ties with the United States, it is unclear whether such a figure exists within Cuba’s political class.

    Ironically, the most harmful thing Cuba’s government could do to the United States might be to collapse. Years of state suppression have left Cuba with no meaningful, organized political resistance capable of seamlessly assuming power in the event of a regime change. If the United States succeeds in collapsing Cuba’s government either by targeting its leaders or because of the economic damage caused by its oil blockade, it could result in a power vacuum. Such a scenario would risk turning Cuba from an irritating but largely harmless adversary to a failed state in America’s backyard, which could easily become a hub for drug-trafficking and destabilize the region through mass migration and the diffusion of Cuban weapons throughout Latin America.

    Whether the Trump administration will pursue regime change in Cuba is a secondary question to whether such a strategy is even worth pursuing. Cuba poses little national security threat to the United States and would stand little chance against the might of American sea and air power. However, in the interest of regional stability, America would be better served by letting the Cuban people determine their own political fate rather than imposing regime change.