National Interest

by Paul J. Saunders

    The US alliance system, if it is to survive, must take into account the increasing coordination of the world’s middle powers.

    The Trump administration’s recalibration of American foreign policy toward a more unilateral pursuit of more narrowly defined US national interests has prompted considerable introspection among US allies and partners from Europe to Asia to the Middle East. Some have publicly asserted that “middle powers” should band together; Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has been a leading spokesperson for this proposal. More significantly, many others are acting without advertising their motives. This could prove costly to the United States if it fails to take this dynamic seriously. And taking it seriously will be a long-term task.

    What is most interesting about the so-called middle powers is that they aren’t in the middle at all. They are among the largest 20 or 30 economies, excluding the top two, the United States and China. Most of the remaining countries on this list are wealthy market democracies. A few are petrostates, like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Others are major emerging markets, like Indonesia and Mexico.

    Russia and India are special cases in that each considers itself a great power rather than a middle power. However, neither is, in economic or military terms, a peer of the United States or China. In fact, they share characteristics with both great powers and middle powers. Russia is uniquely isolated within this group due to its invasion of Ukraine. Both require separate discussion elsewhere.

    What is special about middle powers  In brief, they have a lot to lose as targets or collateral damage of the great powers, on one hand and have the most tools to do something about it, on the other. Canada’s prime minister has made each of these points, noting that “if we’re not at the table, we’re on the menu” and that middle powers have “the capacity…to build our strength at home and act together.”

    Great powers and middle powers also differ in their attitudes toward rules. Great powers don’t need systems of rules, though rules can help to lock in their status by constraining others without constraining them to the same extent because they assert special rights. Middle powers derive considerable benefits from rules that regulate the great powers, or even rules that mostly regulate them and that limit the conduct of others who might threaten their interests.

    These structural forces operate both among states and within them. Classical political thinkers such as Aristotle and Polybius observed similar dynamics among elites in ancient Greece and Rome. Writing about the Roman Republic, Polybius argued that Aristotle’s monarchy, defined as an individual ruling for the common good, inevitably evolved into tyranny, in which an individual rules for personal benefit or for the benefit of a few. This led to conspiracies that were “not the work of the worst men, but of the noblest, most high-spirited and most courageous,” who would replace tyranny with aristocracy, defined as a small group ruling for the common good.

    These small groups were made up of the people who had the most to lose and the most tools at their disposal. Lest the middle powers become overly self-righteous, which is another emerging trend, they should recall that Polybius argued that, like monarchy, aristocracy would eventually transform itself into its corrupt analogue, in that case oligarchy, or rule by a small group for the benefit of a small group.

    For those who might want to go “full Polybius,” Finnish President Alexander Stubb recently said that he expects “the Global South will decide what the next world order will look like” and called for a “cooperative, fair and representative world order based on international institutions, rules and norms.” This is notable in that Finland’s economy is too small to be considered a middle power; Helsinki is among the many, not the few. Polybius saw democracy—rule by the many for the many—overcoming oligarchy, though democracy ultimately corrupts itself too, he wrote, leading many to seek a single strong ruler.

    Returning to the middle powers, 1,300 years after Polybius wrote his account of early Roman history, it was England’s nobles, not its peasants, who rebelled against King John I and pressed for the Magna Carta, which constrained the king’s power. A few centuries after that, Russia’s czars similarly faced pressure from their boyars to limit their absolute rule. Whether successful or not, landed aristocrats rebelling against emperors or kings are ubiquitous throughout global history. The cases in which political systems skip a step, with mass movements overthrowing leaders, often include divisions among elites: one group supports a strong single leader and the other turns to “the many” as its necessary ally. In a way, these cases are coalition-building failures.

    Today, middle powers are building increasingly dense horizontal relationships among themselves, some overtly, others quietly. In recent months, Canada has established a new Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Japan, launched talks on a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with India and begun wide-ranging defense, energy, economic and other negotiations with Australia. European governments are calling for “strategic autonomy,” and the European Union is pursuing a broad partnership agreement and a trade deal with Mexico. South Korea’s president sent his chief of staff to Europe as a special envoy for arms sales, including a potential deal to supply Poland with submarines. The United Arab Emirates is considering jointly developing a jet fighter with South Korea to reduce its dependence on US systems. There are many more such examples.

    These horizontal ties have important consequences for US defense and foreign policy. Many are negative, though effective policy can attenuate them.

    For example, diversification away from US weapons systems could not only reduce exports and cost jobs but also cut profits that might otherwise be available for research and development for new systems. At the same time, smaller production lines could lead to higher unit costs, making the American military more expensive to sustain and much less to expand to meet perceived threats.

    When combined with economic diversification, this defense diversification is also likely to reduce US leverage in dealing with allies and partners. That makes it harder for the United States to build coalitions in support of American and even shared objectives. Uncertainty surrounding US support for allies and the necessary pressure on them to do more themselves similarly reduces Washington’s influence.

    In addition to these two dynamics, denser horizontal connections among middle powers make US diplomacy with middle powers more complex and challenging. Washington will find it increasingly difficult to work strictly bilaterally with middle powers—a long-term preference for great powers that aim to exploit power imbalances—due to extensive new linkages among governments, their interests and policies. This will unavoidably include new troubles working with America’s allies.

    The US alliance system was oriented toward aligning US and allied interests, mainly by providing extended nuclear deterrence and defense commitments and expecting broad deference to American wishes in many areas. Shoving greater responsibility onto US allies and partners (rather than pursuing this necessary goal in other ways) inevitably weakens this alignment. Conversely, denser horizontal contacts among them increase their alignment with one another.

    What this all means is that US foreign policy will have to become much more sophisticated, as will the senior and working-level officials who implement it—expressing an American preference, or insistence, will have diminished value.

    A culture change on this scale could require a generation. To be successful over the long term, it should include not only US officials, but also members of Congress and their advisors and staff, America’s internationally oriented reporters, commentators and others who interpret the world for the American people, think tank and academic experts, government contractors and corporate international government affairs officers. This is a community comprising tens of thousands of professionals, if not more and relying on diverse, disaggregated systems of professional development.

    If the United States begins adapting to dealing with two dozen middle powers, which does not require fully transforming American diplomacy because the middle powers are themselves beginning long-term processes, it could build a new and different leadership role among them. This will be a tougher coalition management challenge for the United States, but it could produce a stronger coalition in areas where the group aligns well. If we fail, future presidents and Americans are likely to find themselves increasingly frustrated by mounting costs and complications and decreasing opportunities in the world outside US borders.