National Interest

by Lesia Bidochko and Oleksandr Kraiev

    The US-Russia peace process became another victim of President Donald Trump’s transactional diplomatic preferences.

    On August 15, 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin, then already wanted by the International Criminal Court and shunned across most of the West, stepped onto American soil and received a red-carpet welcome from President Donald Trump. Ukrainian leaders were entirely absent from the proceedings. For the Trump administration, supporting Kyiv looked too expensive and negotiating with Moscow seemed practical. However, the summit produced neither a ceasefire nor a peace deal and Putin received a public rehabilitation without making any concessions.

    One year later, Russia has turned the summit into a product of its own. A trademark application has even been filed for a fragrance called the “Spirit of Anchorage,” the Kremlin’s preferred label for the understanding it claims Trump and Putin reached in Alaska. Yet, there was no settlement to bottle, no peace to commemorate and no strategic breakthrough to preserve—only an atmosphere. As the substance evaporated, Russia kept the scent.

    The question now is not whether Trump has moved from Putin to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. He has not. The question is what each side can offer a president who wants to turn foreign policy into a transaction he can close. Moscow offers access, energy and geopolitical bargains. Kyiv offers combat-tested technology and industrial know-how. Both may be useful to Trump; neither should mistake usefulness for commitment.

    Before meeting Putin, Trump had already framed US-Ukraine relations in commercial terms. Earlier in 2025, he pressed Kyiv to sign a minerals agreement that would give the United States a tangible return on its support. In Ukraine, the proposal prompted fears that the country would again be treated primarily as a supplier of raw materials rather than as a participant in higher-value production chains.

    The emerging defense relationship follows the same logic but changes what Ukraine can offer. Kyiv brings combat-tested systems, battlefield data and an innovation cycle shaped by constant adaptation to Russian countermeasures—capabilities the United States does not yet possess at comparable speed or scale.

    The two countries are advancing plans for joint drone production, including a factory in the United States that will use Ukrainian technology. Six Ukrainian manufacturers have joined the Pentagon’s Drone Dominance Program, where their systems will be tested against US requirements and, for future orders, produced through American partnerships.

    Ukraine expects to manufacture between 6 and 7 million small attack drones in 2026. By February 2027, the Pentagon’s $1.1 billion program will have ordered fewer than 200,000. The United States retains overwhelming advantages in capital, components and industrial capacity, but remains years behind Ukraine in producing this category of weapon at wartime tempo.

    Washington is trying to convert Ukrainian battlefield learning into American capability. That may create practical interdependence without producing strategic alignment. Ukraine may be becoming more valuable to Trump, but not more secure. The emerging partnership gives Kyiv an additional source of leverage in Washington while leaving the basic relationship conditional: American support remains tied to what the administration can present as a deal.

    With improved cooperation and a growing climate of trust and openness between American and Ukrainian defense companies, one might expect a more positive stance toward supporting Ukrainian interests in the negotiations. Some might even have expected Trump to decide to fulfill his own campaign slogan, “peace through strength,” and become a pro-Ukrainian and Atlanticist US leader. However, the logic of his presidency does not permit clean “pro-” or “anti” stances.

    From Ukraine’s perspective, the recent active and largely productive cooperation created the impression that the United States no longer simply wants to “prevent Ukraine from losing.” It appeared that Washington was ready to invest in both current military projects and post-war reconstruction. Much work went into an agreement on critical minerals, the creation of a reconstruction fund and continued dialogue on the possibility of licensed production of PAC-3 missiles. As the Americans cannot show weakness vis-à-vis China, there was hope that they would continue to support their partner in Europe.

    However, the truth is more straightforward, just like Trump’s foreign policy itself. He simply needs a deal. It no longer matters much who emerges from the war and in what condition. If Trump can sign a deal that bears his name, it will work for the American president.

    Trump could use an agreement to claim once more the Nobel Peace Prize. It would also allow him to forget about this part of the world—just as Trump did not react to the violation of the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas or the resurgence of war between the Congo and Rwanda and Thailand and Cambodia. The durability of a treaty, mutual adherence to its principles, or the long process of building relations between former adversaries interest this administration little.

    An ephemeral “spirit of Anchorage” might lie in the policy of dual pressure. By Trump’s own admission, the meeting with Putin in Alaska was not successful. In its aftermath, no progress was made on any of the various initiatives proposed by the Russian side.

    The meeting may still have had a result—a certain cooling of US relations with Ukraine. A year ago, Kyiv had just begun to establish normal bilateral ties with the new administration. A year after the Alaska summit, the same indeterminate situation that prevailed then still exists. On the one hand, Russia faces new sanctions and its partners face new tariffs and trade restrictions. On the other hand, Ukraine may be left without anti-ballistic missile defense during the most challenging wartime winter.

    As in summer 2025, pressure on both sides to reach an agreement as quickly as possible is present today. No strategic plan exists to implement such an agreement and uncertainty remains about what exactly the White House wants to achieve.