National Interest

by Gregory J. Moore

    China has a growing list of reasons to take Taiwan sooner rather than later.

    The ongoing conflict between the United States and Israel and Iran has handed Chinese President Xi Jinping one more reason to attack Taiwan in the near term. Since the advent of hostilities this past February, the United States has depleted many of its most advanced stocks of interceptors, cruise missiles, aerial drones and other munitions and equipment that it would rely upon to help defend Taiwan, if it chose to do so.

    With the loss of approximately 30–40 percent of US ground attack and air and missile defense munitions and the several years needed to rebuild that arsenal, Washington may not have sufficient resources to mount a strong and durable defense of Taiwan.

    This state of affairs makes it even more likely that Xi will attack Taiwan before August 2027. That month, Xi will meet with top Chinese Communist Party leadership at the pre-Party Congress Beidaihe meeting, where it is likely that he will make a play for another five years as China’s leader. A successful takeover of Taiwan might be just what he needs to persuade other Chinese leaders to allow him to rule for a fourth term, making him the indispensable Chinese 21st-century leader.

    All Chinese communist leaders from Mao Zedong to Xi have sought to prevent Taiwanese independence and longed to see Taiwan merge with the People’s Republic of China. As a “core of China’s core interests,” Taiwan is not something any Chinese leader wants to lose. Alternatively, any leader who brought Taiwan back within Beijing’s fold would be a hero.

    China’s view of its own history values periods of territorial and political unity. Getting Taiwan back completes the “sacred task” of unifying the motherland. Taiwan also grants China numerous strategic advantages, such as allowing the Chinese navy to “break out” of the First Island Chain and seize control of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC). Moreover, erasing the existence of a democratic “Chinese other,” whose existence undermines the prestige of the Chinese party-state, is also an imperative for Beijing.

    Imagine Xi looking at a dashboard with indicators providing him with information on whether to make a move on Taiwan. If the metrics indicate “go,” he’d likely go. If they indicate that the time is not yet ripe, he’d likely wait or forego such a move altogether.

    Thirteen indicators seem most likely to matter to Xi Jinping. For 11 of these 13 indicators, circumstances are more advantageous for an attack on Taiwan in the near term than they would be two or three years out.

    Two indicators present opening windows of opportunity that may delay Chinese plans.

    1. It goes without saying that giving the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) more time to prepare for a possible attack on Taiwan would give it a better chance of success. This argues against a near-term move on Taiwan.

    2. China’s economy is struggling, with reports of major bank insolvency, high youth unemployment and rising trade tensions not only with the United States but also with Europe and elsewhere as well. Some analysts see this as caution-inducing: if the home front isn’t economically stable, war’s uncertainties would discourage bold military moves.

    Eleven indicators present closing windows of opportunity, which may accelerate Chinese plans.

    1. The Taiwanese people’s identity is drifting away from the mainland. A study by National Chengchi University in Taipei shows that year on year since 1992, more and more people identify as Taiwanese and fewer and fewer identify as Chinese. The longer China waits, the further Taiwanese national identity shifts away from Beijing.

    2. Chinese demographic decline means China will have fewer fighting-age persons as a percent of the population over the long term. Mark Haas’ new book, The Geriatric Peace and other studies make this argument. Over the longer term, the longer Xi waits, the harder it might be to sustain a formidable fighting force and this could matter if the operation takes longer than planned.

    3. The importance of Taiwan’s domestic semiconductor industry globally is a key indicator and it is at its most valuable right about now. TSMC is the world’s most vital semiconductor producer and it produces its best chips only in Taiwan. In two to five years, more of TSMC’s high-end production will have moved to the United States, Germany and Japan, among others. Taking control of TSMC sooner, before the offshoring of the most advanced TSMC fabs is complete, would mean China could then use them itself, share them with friends and withhold them from adversaries.

    4. The growing importance of semiconductors to China (vs. China’s increasing isolation). Between the American “entity list,” which limits high-tech items from going to China, the limits on high-end Nvidia products to China and limits on high-end semiconductor chips to China in general, the value of TSMC in Taiwan is perhaps at its highest now for another reason: China is being denied these chips and Taiwan produces them. China cannot produce the most advanced chips itself and the longer it’s denied them, the more it could fall behind Taiwan and the West.

    5. The US commitment to Taiwan is growing. President Joe Biden was the first president to openly say the United States is committed to defending Taiwan. President Donald Trump is less direct, but he has given Taiwan more weapons by dollar value than any US president in history. His under secretary of defense for policy, Elbridge Colby, has famously argued that Taiwan is key to US Pacific and global strategy. We don’t know who will replace Trump in 2029, but in the meantime US aid to Taiwan is growing. The longer China waits, the better prepared Taiwan will be.

    6. US military cooperation with Taiwan does not yet include exercises or a robust build-up of interoperability. If China waits longer, however, US-Taiwan military cooperation will likely only increase, with implications for Chinese strategy.

    7. China has an apparent advantage now with its ship-killer hypersonic weapons. A few extra years before moving on Taiwan would likely mean China’s current hypersonic advantage disappears as US countermeasures improve.

    8. Similarly, the United States is just beginning to field its own hypersonic weapons. Over the next few years, it will have more hypersonic systems at its disposal, making a Chinese move against Taiwan harder than it is now. An earlier move would mean fewer US hypersonic capabilities to deal with.

    9. The state of US-China relations is tense, lowering the bar for war. Logically, when Sino-American relations are poor, the cost of a potential war with the United States for Xi is lower; when Sino-American relations are good, the cost of a potential war between the two is higher. There is not much reason for optimism in Sino-American relations in the coming years, given Trump’s tariffs, the closer US relationship with Taiwan and continued US attacks on China’s friends (Venezuela, Iran and possibly Cuba).

    10. Xi’s view of US intentions toward China is increasingly negative, as evidenced by recent statements. This is not surprising given the developments above. If the US is viewed as having increasingly hostile intent toward China, then the US will be viewed as increasingly likely to encourage Taiwanese independence, defend Taiwan, and/or use force against Mainland forces that might attack Taiwan. If Xi believes US intentions toward China are increasingly malevolent and he is no longer hopeful that relations will improve significantly, then the sooner Beijing resolves the Taiwan issue in its favor, the better.

    11. The Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) win in the Taiwan 2024 elections means a party that Beijing calls “separatists” will run the island until at least 2028. Polling in Taiwan shows the DPP remains the most popular party. Moreover, pro-China Kuomintang Party (KMT) chairwoman Cheng Li-wun’s recent visit to China to meet with Xi met with an unfavorable public reaction. Consequently, Xi may see no advantage in waiting for political trends in Taiwan to improve.

    To sum up, for 11 of the 13 indicators highlighted here, the longer Xi waits to make a move on Taiwan, the harder it may be.

    12. The depletion of many of the US’ most advanced stocks of interceptors, cruise missiles, aerial drones and other munitions because of the US-Israeli campaign against Iran is now a new factor we must consider in the Taiwan context. The US-Israeli military campaign that began February 28, 2026 and has continued, on and off, until the present, may prove to be a boon for China regarding Taiwan.

    Given that any US military intervention over Taiwan would be primarily conducted by air and sea, these are exactly the munitions most needed and reporting says it will take two to three years to replenish them; we have one more reason for Xi to take Taiwan sooner rather than later.

    The argument presented here is not intended as a Nostradamus-like prediction that Xi Jinping will certainly invade Taiwan before mid-2027. Only God and Xi Jinping himself know whether that is the case and Xi himself may not even know for certain. Rather, what is presented here is an argument that first, Xi has an interest in taking Taiwan; second, there are more reasons to move on Taiwan in the near term than there are for waiting 2–3 years; and third, this should be a wake-up call for any in the United States or Taiwan that seek to defend Taiwan or deter China.

    US Indo-Pacific Command’s Admiral Samuel Paparo argued last year that the increased exercises and activities of PRC forces around Taiwan are a “dress rehearsal” for an invasion of Taiwan. The stakes are high. At the end of the day, the argument that “Xi is not crazy enough to invade Taiwan” is not persuasive and the US munitions crisis makes it less so.