National Interest

by Nico Lange

    The US-China bilateral relationship is increasingly setting rules that everyone else has no choice but to follow.

    Every September, global leaders descend on New York for the annual United Nations General Assembly. Entourages, events, press conferences and speeches overtake the city—clogging streets and commanding attention—and then it is gone, almost as if it never happened. That is apt, because despite the annual burst of attention, the United Nations’ political impact is negligible at best—and that is being kind. The one thing most people remember about last year’s UNGA is the image of President Donald Trump stuck on an escalator. And when Secretary-General António Guterres’ term expires at the end of this year, hardly anyone will know what he looks like, let alone what issues defined his tenure.

    While the spectacle plays out in New York, the real action is taking place elsewhere. Chinese President Xi Jinping flew past the assembled international community in New York and headed straight to Washington to meet with President Trump. It is the second in a series of four planned meetings that began with Trump’s state visit to China in May 2026.

    No multilateral framework and no wider group are at the table—just the two countries at the center of global power. Their meetings are likely to have more real-world consequences than all the speeches at the UN General Assembly combined.

    These meetings between Trump and Xi are creating an informal bilateral power structure that increasingly concentrates consequential global decisions between Washington and Beijing. It is not rules-based or multilateral, nor does it necessarily serve anyone else’s interests. Instead, it is entirely personal, highly tactical, and, unfortunately, asymmetric.

    For Trump, the show is what matters most. For Xi, it’s the impact. This imbalance is shaping an emerging G2 world—an informal order in which the United States and China increasingly deal directly on the issues that shape global power, leaving everyone else to react.

    Beijing is already exploiting Trump’s craving for the big stage—and every opening he leaves—with strategic precision. For months, it has been establishing a new normal around Taiwan. Chinese fishing vessels and other ships are appearing in ever greater numbers. At the same time, Beijing patrols waters that are supposed to be international and steadily increases pressure not only on Taiwan, but on other states in the Indo-Pacific.

    US aircraft carriers, once the visible symbol of American deterrence, have been withdrawn from the region to the Western Hemisphere and the Gulf. Nevertheless, Trump is determined to hold the next major meeting with Xi and, in the meantime, is letting this escalation slide. For Xi, that is a geopolitical win. Silence begins to look like acceptance.

    At the same time, Beijing is working behind the scenes to exploit global chokepoints against the United States. In the Strait of Hormuz and at Bab-el-Mandeb in the Red Sea, structures are being established that may make passage harder and more expensive for everyone except China. Beijing’s influence extends into Iran, Pakistan, many Gulf states, and the Houthis in Yemen. Since the American attack on Iran, Beijing has also been supporting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) with reconnaissance and satellite data.

    This makes it easier to weaken the United States when Iran strikes rare and expensive radar systems, strategically important missile defense systems, or US bases. Since the start of the war, high-value American military assets in the Gulf have been damaged or destroyed. Trump acts as if he doesn’t notice. He does not confront Xi about it. This has far-reaching geopolitical consequences.

    Meanwhile, since Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s now-famous speech at Davos, Europe—and indeed others—have come to see themselves as the new “middle powers,” engaging in romantic discussions about new alliances, “shaping power,” and the international order of the future. These are ambitious and serious debates, but to date they have offered virtually no alternative to the emerging US-China G2.

    A new reality is not being negotiated in Berlin, Paris, or Ottawa, but in the Oval Office and in Zhongnanhai.

    The next chapter of this G2 world is already unfolding. The United States and China are beginning to reach an understanding on artificial intelligence. It echoes the early talks over weapons of mass destruction: an attempt to define rules for a technology that could alter the strategic balance. Once again, only two are sitting at the table. Everyone else will be handed the rules.

Beyond the obvious question of where European—or more broadly, middle-power—interests lie in such a G2 world, a more pressing one emerges: what happens if an American president does not engage in strategic competition with China but instead avoids it  What if he does not address conflicts with China but ignores them  What if Trump allows a G2 that is not a balance of power, but a global shift toward China

    While the spectacle at the UN in New York pretends to shape global affairs, the talks between Trump and Xi are reshaping the international order. Unfortunately, so far not in the West’s favor.