National Interest

by Andreas Umland and Lesia Bidochko

    Russian escalation in the near term is likely to remain conventional or hybrid. Nuclear escalation or direct attacks on Europe are still unlikely.

    Since June 2026, the Ukraine War has transformed. For three months now, Ukraine has been able to launch an increasing number of deep drone and missile strikes inside Russia targeting refineries, tankers, arms factories, storage sites and logistics centers. These have altered the war’s character for Russian society. What had been a distant conflict now produces domestic disruptions, including fuel shortages, daily bankruptcies and reduced government revenues. Ukraine’s strategy aims to pressure Russia economically to end the war or, at least, accept a ceasefire.

    Ukraine’s increasingly deep strikes have shaken the social contract between the Russian public and the Kremlin: the regime may act freely in politics as long as everyday life remains stable. Long‑range Ukrainian attacks now threaten economic and social stability. If Ukraine maintains momentum and inflicts further damage on Russia’s energy and logistics infrastructure, cascading effects could spread across agriculture, banking and aviation.

    The Kremlin has rejected Kyiv’s proposals for a ceasefire or mutual moratorium on deep strikes. A compromise would contradict the ideological foundations and strongman image at the heart of President Vladimir Putin’s rule. Russia’s jingoist mass media, military bloggers and ultra‑nationalist activists demand retaliation, not moderation. Moscow’s immediate reaction has thus been intensified terror attacks on Ukrainian civilians and expanded hybrid operations against European entities supporting Ukraine.

The Kremlin seeks revenge to demonstrate resolve and military potency, deter further Ukrainian strikes and weaken Western support. This strategy follows the Russian concept of “escalate to de‑escalate.” Which further escalation paths are feasible and what Western measures can reduce their effectiveness

    So far, Russia’s primary response has been intensified conventional escalation along previous lines of anti-civilian warfare. This includes expanded bombardment of Ukrainian critical infrastructure such as hospitals, warehouses, or power stations, as well as cultural institutions like libraries, churches, or universities and especially increased missile and drone attacks on Kyiv. The 2026 surge partly reflects a reprioritization of finite Russian strike assets toward the capital.

    However, Russia’s increased bombardment of Kyiv and other key cities like Odesa also stems from growing production capacity. Ukrainian intelligence reports that Russia can now produce over 200 cruise and ballistic missiles monthly. If Russia succeeds in producing cheap long‑range weapons at scale, it could sustain or increase pressure on Kyiv and other big cities without reducing attacks elsewhere.

    This would create two challenges for Ukraine: more incoming weapons requiring more interceptors and a more dispersed threat complicating defense of logistics hubs, command centers, air bases and cities. Russia may also escalate by drawing Belarus into the war, deploying more North Korean troops, recruiting more foreign mercenaries, or finally launching mass mobilization. A key question for 2027 is whether Russia can implement these and similar plans before Ukrainian strikes disrupt them.

    Concerning escalation with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Russia has already employed methods approaching the use of such arms. It has attacked Ukrainian nuclear power plants, destroyed the huge Kakhovka Dam on the Dnipro River and used chemical weapons. Western reactions to these provocations have been muted, increasing the likelihood of further escalation.

    Above all, Moscow will continue nuclear signaling, potentially revising its military doctrine, as it did in 2024, or conducting exercises involving delivery systems of atomic warheads. A nuclear test at a place like Novaya Zemlya would mark a new stage of signaling. More directly escalatory options include new attacks on civilian nuclear facilities, a demonstrative nuclear detonation in an uninhabited area of Ukraine, or—most extreme—the use of a tactical nuclear weapon against Ukrainian forces or civilians.

    Yet, escalation with WMDs carries two major risks for Russia. First, breaking the 80‑year nuclear taboo will disrupt the world security system. It could thus trigger severe global backlash, including from China and India, undermining Russia’s diplomatic position.

    Second, Ukraine has demonstrated the ability to strike deep into Russia. If Russia used WMD and international reaction were insufficient, Ukraine might consider developing retaliatory capabilities, including “dirty bombs,” ie, conventional warheads with material emitting radiation from its nuclear plants. While such a retaliation would be more effective than a proper nuclear counterstrike, a possible radioactive contamination of Russian state territory will be consequential for Russia.

    Across Europe recently, the idea that Russia may escalate via a military advance beyond Ukraine has become a hot topic. According to the logic of this scenario, a conventional Russian attack in, for example, the Baltic or Black Sea regions, could aim to shock NATO and the EU into reducing support for Ukraine. However, such an attack could also have the opposite effect of increasing European support for Ukraine. Above all, it could trigger Article 4 of NATO’s Washington Treaty and Article 42 of the EU’s Lisbon Treaty, thereby drawing Russia into a two-front war against the West and Ukraine—an outcome to Moscow’s disadvantage. For these reasons, a conventional military attack on NATO or EU territory is unlikely.

    On the other hand, hybrid escalation across Europe is already rising and likely to intensify further. Russia will likely increase its cyber sabotage, attacks on defense manufacturers, logistics hubs, railways, airports and ports, GPS jamming, airspace violations, drone intrusions and disinformation campaigns timed to elections. These operations exploit ambiguity, delay attribution and complicate responses. So far, NATO and the EU lack sufficient pre‑agreed responses that can be activated before spiking uncertainty becomes a Russian advantage.

    The Kremlin’s most radical escalation options—WMD use in Ukraine or a conventional attack against a NATO member state—are also the most dangerous and costly for Russia. Moscow’s most likely escalation paths are therefore intensified terror attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and expanded hybrid warfare against Europe.

    To make escalation a losing bargain for Moscow, the EU should make Russia’s missiles and drones harder to build through better tracing of recovered foreign components and quicker sanctions against their producers and traders. Western and non-Western partners of Ukraine should engage in co‑producing low‑cost interceptors and electronic warfare systems with Ukraine. European countries need to develop protocols to protect logistics hubs supporting Ukraine, defining detection, neutralization, rerouting and restart procedures.