
by Peter Eltsov
Assigning guilt to a whole nation may be difficult to swallow, but the world cannot ignore Russian popular complicity in the Ukraine War.
Politicians and public figures in the West often call the Ukraine War “Vladimir Putin’s war.” Evidently, there is a wish to avoid alienating the Russian people by assigning them responsibility for the war. Likewise, many in the Russian opposition, including some of its most prominent members, follow the same trend. Vladimir Kara-Murza, who had spent over two years in prison as a political prisoner, continually objects to blaming the Russian people for this war. Yulia Navalnaya, the widow of the Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, believes that pro-war Russians are a small minority. After four years of war, this view is increasingly at odds with reality. There is no point denying that a substantial segment of Russian society clearly and genuinely supports Russia’s war on Ukraine.
Before I moved to the United States over three decades ago, I taught history in one of the best secondary schools in St. Petersburg, School 210. Located at the heart of that beautiful city, a five-minute walk from the Hermitage Museum, this school educated many Russian dignitaries: artists, scholars and film directors. In the early 1990s, it created an exclusive high-school curriculum emphasizing literature and history.
Following the liberating years of the Gorbachev-Reagan rapprochement, that period was one of the freest in Russian history. To my students, who viewed themselves as the intellectual elite, I was able to talk openly about the darkest pages of Russian history: imperialism, genocides, antisemitism, the Gulag and the deportations of whole peoples. Hungry for intellectual growth, they studied history with passion. Many were fascinated by Western civilization, especially the United States. Indeed, at the time Russia and the United States were on the way of becoming partners, if not friends. On June 17, 1992, then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin ended his address to a joint session of the US Congress with the words “God Bless America and Russia.”
Aside from occasional correspondence and one meeting, I have not kept in touch with these students. Yet I felt we were and would forever remain, on the same side of history. At the end of February of 2022, after Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, I was shocked to learn that many of them supported the war—and did so with passion and conviction. I also realized that in a dictatorship, where public opinion polls (which nonetheless show high levels of popular support for the war) cannot be trusted, these personal observations are the best indicator of society at large. If in central St. Petersburg, which has always been seen as a cultural and pro-Western capital of Russia, a substantial number of financially successful and highly refined individuals support a blatant war of aggression, what should one expect from the rest of the country
The gruesome reality is that, despite more than four years of brutal setbacks for Russian armed forces and hundreds of thousands of casualties, many among the Russian educated elites still genuinely back the Russian war against Ukraine. And not for money, or for publicity, or even fear of President Putin—but because these are their real convictions and, as they believe, for the sake of Russia and its future.
Consider the views of Russia’s two prominent artists-cum-public figures: the violist and conductor Yuri Bashmet and the film director Vladimir Bortko.
Yuri Bashmet is one of Russia’s most decorated and celebrated classical musicians. With numerous prestigious awards, including the Danish Sonning Award (1995), the Italian Order of Merit (2000), the French Legion of Honor (2003) and the Grammys (2008), Bashmet could have undoubtedly moved to the West. Not only has he not done so, but he has continuously endorsed Putin and supported the Russian war on Ukraine. On one occasion, while receiving an award personally from Putin, Bashmet said, without a shred of embarrassment, that he dearly loved the Russian president, making even Putin look uncomfortable. In one of his more recent interviews, Bashmet claimed that he would be ready to take up arms and fight for Russia in Ukraine.
Vladimir Bortko is one of Russia’s most popular film directors. Born in Moscow and raised in Kyiv, Bortko has produced several highly acclaimed films known for their outstanding cinematography, superb actors and profound content. Bortko not only supports the war, but he also believes that the best outcome of the war would be “the liberation” of all of Ukraine, especially of his beloved Kyiv, which he considers a purely Russian city.
Remarkably, Bortko’s most celebrated production is The Heart of a Dog (1988)—a film based on the novel of the same name by Mikhail Bulgakov, a Russian writer who, like Bortko, was raised in Kyiv. The film is a deep satire of the Soviet attempts at social engineering. The main character, a Moscow medical professor, transplants human organs onto a stray dog, transforming it into a man who personifies all the worst traits of Soviet culture.
Abhorred by his creation’s behavior, the doctor decides to turn the man back into a dog. The story’s subtext is that one cannot create a new Soviet man out of a brute proletariat. Oddly enough, the conveyance of such a deep anti-Communist message through art has not prevented Bortko from embracing the worst of the worst of Russian imperialism.
These examples are not taken out of context. They exemplify a much broader pattern. Even among the Russians living abroad, a substantial number vote for Putin. For example, in the 2024 presidential election, official data show Putin won the votes of Russian expatriates in Germany and the United States.
More than three decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia not only has made a full circle by returning to its totalitarian and imperial identity, but it has also arrived at the worst form of nationalism in its entire history. Under Putin, Russia sees itself as a civilizational state with primordial roots in the Mongol Empire, Kyivan Rus and Byzantium. Russian exceptionalism is fecund, portraying Russian history as a continuum of magnificent achievements without any acts of wrongdoing.
All of Russia’s wars are now presented as just and the words “colonization” and “conquest” are being replaced with “exploration” and “incorporation.” In other words, the Caucasus, Central Asia and Siberia were neither colonized nor conquered; they were allegedly explored, incorporated and civilized. This linguistic shift signifies a direct and impenitent return to the most imperialist rhetoric of the Tsarist era. Even Soviet leaders did not use this language—at least officially.
In Vladimir Putin’s quarter-century reign, the Russian state has been indoctrinating its citizens with this version of Russian history. For example, senior public figures like Patriarch Kirill and Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov now claim that Russia has never in its history attacked any other country.
Yet even this scale of propaganda and utter lies was not enough for the Kremlin during the war. Shortly after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian government introduced mandatory patriotic lessons, the so-called “important conversations,” aimed at justifying the Russian war on Ukraine, into the curricula of secondary and high schools. The Oscar-Winning documentary Mr. Nobody against Putin recorded this horrifying project most vividly.
The Kremlin’s efforts have been met with a response from the Russian people, because they revived two historically rooted Russian sensibilities: exceptionalism and messianism, traits that turned out to be dormant rather than dead during the late Soviet and early post-Soviet years. As part of this project and, in some cases, under the personal patronage of Putin, the Russian government rehabilitated and lionized the legacy of some of Russia’s most conservative and reactionary thinkers: Nikolay Danilevsky (1822–1885), Konstantin Leontiev (1831–1891), Ivan Ilyin (1883–1954) and Lev Gumilev (1912–1992).
What united these individuals was their abhorrence of democracy and liberalism. As Konstantin Leontiev postulated in his work Byzantinism and Slavdom (1875), “neither a Polish revolt nor a peasant rebellion…could cause Russia as much damage as could be caused by a very peaceful, very lawful democratic constitution.”
The Russian opposition leader Kara-Murza likes to quote Hannah Arendt, a Jewish German-American historian and philosopher who opposed the notion of collective guilt. Based on her report of the trial of Adolf Eichmann, a high-ranking Nazi officer and one of the architects of the Holocaust, Arendt famously coined the phrase “the banality of evil”—an idea that seemingly ordinary people can commit horrendous crimes by merely following orders and societal trends. Guilt, according to Arendt, is deeply individual, not collective. “Where all are guilty, nobody in the last analysis can be judged,” she wrote. Notably, Arendt’s argument faced criticism in Israel and elsewhere, especially from Holocaust survivors.
Clearly, one cannot accuse an entire nation of causing a war. Yet one can accuse a considerable part of a nation of complicity in a war. And the fact that guilt is an individual feeling does not exclude it from becoming collective, if a substantial number of individuals accept it—either deliberately or under pressure. In this case, the view of the German-Swiss psychiatrist and philosopher Karl Jaspers seems more appropriate to me. Jaspers distinguished between four types of guilt: criminal, political, moral and metaphysical. Millions of Russians would stand accused if Jasper’s ideas were to be applied to the Ukraine war.
The political and military leadership of Russia who stand behind the decision to invade Ukraine and who lead the daily military operations in Ukraine, plus the Russians who commit war crimes in Ukraine and possibly the Russians who have voluntarily signed contracts with the Russian Armed Forces, should carry criminal guilt. The top media propagandists and public intellectuals who advocate for and justify the war on Ukraine are in the same boat, as they carry direct responsibility for the indoctrination of the population.
Russian citizens like my former high-school students who voice support for the war and those citizens who silently vote for Putin carry moral guilt, as their deeds rest with their conscience. They are also politically guilty, as political guilt involves not only the deeds of statesmen but also the deeds of ordinary citizens.
The broader international community—politicians, public figures, entrepreneurs and all those who, in one way or another, have empowered Putin and his cronies over the past quarter of a century—carries metaphysical guilt. As Jaspers explained, this type of guilt is that “there exists a solidarity among men as human beings that makes each co-responsible for every wrong and every injustice in the world, especially for crimes committed in his presence or with his knowledge.”
Criminal guilt can be established only in court, yet moral, political and metaphysical guilt can and need to be acknowledged individually. I surely accept my own personal guilt for the views and actions of those of my former students who support Russia’s war on Ukraine.

Mr.BadGuy
Publisher
Mr.BadGuy
Publisher
These soldiers are from a country whose president is a Jew Zelensky. Orthodox churches are also being destroyed in this country. Synagogues are not touched. Surprisingly, it turns out that Jews get along well with the Bandera Nazis.