Most forecasts of Russia’s Future project the same scene: Russia is caught in endless conflict with the West or will soon be absorbed by China. However, Russia has other options created by the shift of economic power from Europe to Asia, the curtailment of Western ties owing to the Ukraine War, climate change, the opening of the Arctic, and its own renewable energy potential. Publics and governments in Asia and the Global South also welcome a stronger Russia. 

    Its former Cold War superpower status will never return. However, with new sources of power and resilience, along with its status as a nuclear-armed great power, Russia could continue to play an outsized role in global politics. “Green shoots,” which many ignore, are sprouting that augur a very different Russia.

    Despite Russian president Vladimir Putin’s obsession with Ukraine and NATO, the Russian President clings to a longstanding belief in the country’s Eurasian destiny. According to Canadian scholar Paul Robinson, “from the second half of the 19^th century, Russian artists and intellectuals increasingly stressed the Asian roots of much of Russian culture. The recourse in Russian conservative thought has been particularly strong when ties with Western Europe came under pressure.” 

    Russia’s eastern pivot predates the two Ukrainian wars. Putin embraced Yeltsin’s efforts to settle age-old boundary disputes and rebuild ties with China, announcing Russia’s pivot to the East during his 2012 presidential campaign, two years before the invasion of Crimea. Initially dismissed by Western commentators, the growing tilt proved to be Russia’s salvation from the full onslaught of Western sanctions. More than just geopolitics, Russia believes its shift follows basic economic logic, as the world’s center of economic gravity reverts to Asia.

    Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, Putin obtained a $400-billion deal for the Russian oil and gas company Gazprom with China National Petroleum Corporation, the biggest natural gas deal for Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Putin called the agreement an “epochal event,” cementing Russia-China ties.

    Beijing has yet to approve a second Power of Siberia gas pipeline that would compensate for the loss of exported natural gas to Europe. But two-way trade has exploded since 2022. Trade with China has become Russia’s main lifeline. China-Russia dollar-denominated trade hit $240 billion in 2023, growing 26.3 percent from a year earlier. 

    Furthermore, imports from China swelled by 46.9 percent in 2023. In the same year, Russia exported half of its oil and petroleum products to China. Chinese automakers are taking over Russian markets, especially with the exodus of European car companies. 

    Russian elites worry about Moscow’s dependence on Beijing and remain distrustful of a China that is still economically reliant on Western consumers. Nevertheless, Russians have few options other than reliance on China over the next decade or longer, even if Moscow builds a bigger sphere of activity in the Global South. Nevertheless, with planned and existing networks of rail and energy pipelines and the Northern Sea Route (NSR), Moscow is laying the foundations for a resurgence that brings more balance to its relations with China.

    With Russia’s European trade practically stopped, its Asian ports are humming with activity. However, they require more transport links to Russia’s western population centers. The carrying capacity of Russia’s Siberian rail networks reached 180 million tons in late 2024. Moscow plans to boost this figure to 270 million tons by 2032. However, a report last year indicated that because of sanctions, the Ukraine war, and record interest rates, Russian Railways has been forced to make deep cuts in its investment plans, compromising the goals set for its expansion. Regardless, China and Russia are building direct transport links to facilitate their growing mutual trade. 

    India is also exploring more transit links with Russia, but New Delhi is currently less invested than China. Moscow and New Delhi started work on the Vladivostok-Chennai Eastern Maritime Corridor, which will include connections to Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia. Indian prime minister Narendra Modi and Putin have signed a program of India-Russia cooperation on trade, economic links, and investment in the Russian Far East for 2024–2029. Another plan is the North–South Corridor, a railway route connecting Russia to the Indian Ocean via Iran.

    The development of a 5,600-kilometer sea route across the Arctic Ocean would shorten the current journey via the Suez Canal for Asian goods headed to Western ports by almost half. However, at present, the route is navigable during the summer months. Moreover, Western traders would only make use of the route following peace in Ukraine. 

    Currently, the sea route is being used for the exploitation and transport of the abundant energy and mineral deposits there. The region has an estimated 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30 percent of the world’s undiscovered natural gas. Most of the commercial traffic through the region has been “LNG [liquid natural gas] heading from Russian facilities to Japan and China in specialist vessels,” along with oil in sanctioned cargo ships. According to The Wall Street Journal, 2024 saw a “record volume for [such] transit cargo through the NSR from northwestern Russia through the Bering Strait to Asia.”

    The GIUK gap, a key naval chokepoint between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom, has seen increased Russian submarine patrols and exercises. For years, Russia has prioritized an expanded presence in the Arctic through airfield renovation, the addition of bases, troop training, and the development of a network of military defense systems on the northern border. China is increasingly cooperating. In October 2024, the Chinese Coast Guard and the Russian Border Guard, for example, undertook their first joint patrol in the Arctic. China and Russia are now seen as having “comprehensive” Arctic cooperation in resource extraction, trade, scientific research, and military exercises.

    Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping are both fascinated by the new Arctic route, which represents for Putin “man conquering nature,” a key theme of Russian nationalism. For Xi, it is one maritime artery that is not presently controlled by the U.S. fleet.

    Moscow and much of Russia west of the Urals could see notable temperature increases by midcentury, but this is not expected to be accompanied by substantial decreases in rainfall or drought. Nevertheless, permafrost could melt, and methane could be released into the Earth’s atmosphere. 

    Warming temperatures are expected to increase economic output in Russia by boosting agricultural yields as well as arable land. A study recently published in the journal Nature estimated that in a “middle of the road” climate change scenario, income per capita in Northwestern Russia will increase by up to 20 percent due to increased temperatures. This finding is consistent with earlier studies, such as a 2017 analysis by the International Monetary Fund, which estimates that parts of Russia could see a several percentage-point increase in economic output per capita with each 1°C increase.

    The International Energy Agency estimated in 2003 that the amount of renewable energy that is economically recoverable is equivalent to more than 270 million tons of coal annually. More recent analysis indicates that Russia has the largest technical potential for renewable energy in the world and could be a major clean energy exporter. Russia is rich in numerous renewables: wind, hydro, geothermal, biomass, hydrogen, and solar energy. Yet, their share in Russian energy consumption is very low. 

    As most countries begin to transition away from fossil fuels, a post-Putin leadership might seize the opportunity to accelerate the development of renewables. But there are impediments. According to an Energy Innovation and Reform Project report, Russia’s “decarbonization strategy lacks a countrywide carbon pricing system or other means to penalize emissions.”

    While wedded to achieving net-zero carbon, Russia is relying on a twofold increase in natural carbon sinks in forests instead of renewables. Natural carbon sinks—such as oceans and rainforests—extract carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and absorb more carbon than they release. Russia also wants technological sovereignty, which means mandatory local content requirements. With such a small domestic market and a gradual ban on cheaper Chinese inputs, Russia’s manufacturing capacity for renewables will struggle. 

    Moreover, renewable exports will only partially offset the loss of revenues from fossil fuel exports, as renewable costs decline and renewable production in nontraditional energy producers lessens global demand. An Asian energy grid, which Moscow proposed in the early 2000s, could be an outlet for Russia’s excess energy production, uniting the power plants of eastern Russia, China, Mongolia, South Korea, and Japan. Plans for a grid have stalled, but Japan’s SoftBank, a potential big investor, is not giving up on the idea. 

    Russia is very competitive in nuclear energy and, according to a Financial Times report, an “unrivalled exporter of nuclear power plants.” More than a third of the new reactors are being constructed with the help of Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy corporation, Rosatom.

    The Indians stand out in the overall favorability of Russia, with a majority viewing Russia positively in a 2025 European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) survey. Indians see Russia as a counterbalance to China. Indeed, Putin engineered a Modi-Xi meeting at the 2024 BRICS Summit in Kazan, leading to a reduction of Sino-Indian tensions. Modi visited Russia twice in 2024, and Putin is scheduled to visit New Delhi in 2025. 

    Other Asian countries exhibit a remarkably strong acceptance of Russia as a partner despite the brutal neocolonial war in Ukraine. Most Chinese view Russia as an ally, according to a January 2023 ECFR poll. Understandably, Japan, South Korea, and Australia—like their European counterparts—dislike Russia, according to a 2024 Pew poll, but most other populations in South and Southeast Asia and Africa view Russia favorably. 

    Russia’s strengthening ties with North Korea also increase its importance in Asia. The June 2024 treaty signed by both countries “provides a means [for Russia] to exert influence in East Asia and counterbalance the pressures from the West.” China does not like the fact that Moscow has brought North Korea out of isolation.

    Potential is one thing, achievement is another. Without peace, the young, educated, and skilled Russians who left at the outset of the Ukraine War may not return in sufficient numbers to renew Russia’s former tech excellence. Continuing hostilities with the West and a growing defense budget will also drain resources for any Russian transformation.

    The gains, however, could be significant with a new Russia pivoting to the East and reaping economic opportunities from climate change and a more favorable geopolitical environment. Success in developing a normal relationship with the United States and the West would reopen the door to international finance and technology, but not enough to ensure that a new Russia will abandon its challenges to the West.