National Interest

by Mike Fredenburg

    The Pentagon needs an independent testing and evaluation office to make sure it develops systems that fit the military’s needs.

    Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has set about correcting one of the two main sources of US military decline: DEI. Diversity, equity and inclusion policies undermined the warrior ethos, reduced training effectiveness and established leader selection and advancement criteria on bases other than merit and ability. However, he has left the second problem—corrupt and ineffective weapons systems development and procurement—largely untouched.

    Hegseth’s decision to reduce the Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) from 94 to just 45 people (military and civilian) suggests he is receiving and accepting advice from the wrong quarters. Those recommending gutting the DOT&E clearly don’t support, or do not understand that deep and disruptive defense procurement reforms are absolutely necessary to reverse the decline in US military power—a decline that will only accelerate by spending additional hundreds of billions on defense prior to implementing deep, disruptive defense reforms that upset the status quo.

    Yes, weapon system development takes too long. And yes, the Department of Defense is full of organizations performing duplicative and overlapping tasks. Cutting redundancy is a worthwhile goal. But before doing so, one must ensure the targeted organizations are the problem. Unfortunately, Hegseth has targeted the DOT&E, an organization that is often unfairly scapegoated for the slow development and rollouts of weapons systems.

    In spite of opposition from defense contractors and the military establishment, the DOT&E was created as part of the 1983 Department of Defense Authorization Act, signed by President Ronald Reagan. Its statutory mission is to serve as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on operational and live-fire test and evaluation of major defense acquisition programs. Its raison d’être is to ensure weapons systems are combat-effective through the independent oversight and assessment of the operational test results conducted by the six services.

    These military services have their own operational test agencies, including the Army Test and Evaluation Command, the Navy’s Operational Test & Evaluation Force (conducts Coast Guard testing as well), the Air Force Operational Test & Evaluation Center, the Marine Corps Test and Evaluation Activity office and the Space Force’s Operational Test Agency. DOT&E helps design the services’ operational tests, monitors the tests to ensure they are conducted properly and then provides independent analysis of the tests.

    These independent assessments by DOT&E inform budgetary and acquisition decisions for the Secretary of Defense and Congress. Suffice it to say that with the roughly 240 to 270 programs that it oversees at any one time, the office can’t fulfill its statutory mandate with only 45 people.

    Prior to 1983, operational testing lacked both independence and centralized coordination, with each military service conducting its own evaluations, often inconsistently and unaccountably. The DOT&E was created in response to this sorry state of affairs to provide standardized, impartial assessments of the operational testing that is supposed to demonstrate that weapon systems will be effective on the real-world battlefield.

    It is not at all true that DOT&E is responsible for slow weapons system rollouts. That problem largely stems from Congress failing to hold the services and defense contractors accountable, along with the services and defense contractors designing overly complex weapons systems with flawed operational concepts that rely on immature and unreliable technology. Systems designed in this fashion rarely perform well in operational testing and are consequently called out by DOT&E. Consequently, the defense contractors and their allies/future employees are thwarted in their desire to get full-rate production contracts approved and generate money as rapidly as they wish.

    Still, while DOT&E often puts the brakes on how fast weapons systems are approved, Congress and the military will often ignore or discount DOT&E recommendations and analysis and move ahead with funding and producing unreliable weapons systems that fail to provide the battlefield capabilities for which they were contracted. Yet, despite success in eventually getting past negative DOT&E analysis, the fact that such analysis is being produced embarrasses those in the defense establishment—and they don’t like it.

    National Security Reform Director of the Stimson Center, Dan Grazier, notes that “DOT&E has been a thorn in the side of defense contractors and senior Pentagon leadership for decades because the office has consistently told the truth about how poorly many of their pet projects perform. They would love to see it neutered and made into an organization that can do little more than rubber stamp inadequate testing and the SecDef’s proposal does just.” Grazier expanded on the importance of DOT&E in an analysis published in Responsible Statecraft.

    Hence, Secretary Hegseth’s move to gut the DOT&E is exactly opposite of what needs to be done to improve defense procurement effectiveness. If Hegseth is serious about reversing the decline in US military power and I strongly believe he is, then he needs to strengthen the DOT&E by expanding its staff and ensuring that the staff remains independent.

    Furthermore, the onus for improving the speed and quality of weapons system development should be placed on the services that sign off on weapon system designs predicated on unproven or flawed concepts of operations and immature technologies that are practically guaranteed to come in late, over-budget and under-performing. The Zumwalt Destroyer program, the F-35, the Army’s Future Combat Systems and the Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey are just a few prominent examples of such flawed weapon system programs.

    Ultimately, Secretary Hegseth deserves kudos for taking on the wokeness that has for decades permeated our military. He also deserves applause for his efforts to accelerate the development of weapons systems. However, bringing back effective weapons systems development to the US military requires taking on entrenched defense contractors, a Congress awash in defense contractor money and influence and a military establishment closely tied to defense contractors.

    A beefed-up DOT&E with the right director in place would be a valuable ally for the defense secretary in accomplishing the hugely important mission of restoring effectiveness to defense procurement. If, on the other hand, he goes through with crippling an organization that could help him save hundreds of billions in order to achieve savings of $300 million, his decision will have played right into the hands of those who oppose the kind of reforms necessary to restore our ability to produce cost-effective weapon systems.