National Interest

by Michael O’Hanlon and Samuel Weber

    If the right incentives are applied, Rwanda and the DRC have the chance to cement a mutually beneficial relationship.

Recent efforts, catalyzed largely by the Trump administration, to produce a peace deal involving Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), as well as their various sub-state proxies, have been paired with US investment in the Congolese mining sector. Can this novel economic component to the peace process for one of Africa’s overlooked conflicts succeed

    The idea is a huge lift, to be sure. Despite the signing ceremony in Washington at the end of June, which involved President Donald Trump, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, as well as the foreign ministers of Rwanda and the DRC, no concrete economic development plan has been put in place as of yet. Nor is there an implementation plan for the security part of the vision.

    Several armed players are at odds in that region, creating a witches’ brew of anarchy and mayhem. The militaries of the DRC and, at times, Rwanda, their non-state allies (most prominently M23, the Rwanda-backed rebel group that currently controls the major city of Goma, as well as significant, mineral-rich territory in eastern DRC) and a weak United Nations peacekeeping operation that is likely headed for the exits within months all rub shoulders.

    There is cause for skepticism about this deal. In the eyes of many, it is more performative than substantial—an artifact of the Trump administration’s penchant for the spotlight and Rwanda and the DRC’s willingness to entertain him to curry favor. It could simply collapse before going into effect. Another danger is that granting foreign firms poorly regulated access to a significant portion of the DRC’s mineral reserves could exacerbate corruption and facilitate further extraction of wealth from the DRC without the Congolese people reaping any benefits from it.

    Economic integration is not the only place where the specifics of the deal remain fuzzy. Its promise to create a “joint security mechanism” missed its July 27 deadline but started implementing the deal on August 8. The main purpose of this mechanism is to facilitate the “neutralization” of the Front Démocratique pour la Liberation de Rwanda (FDLR), a militia started by Rwandan former gdénocidaires from the 1994 genocide.

    Rwanda states that it will only withdraw from the DRC when the FDLR has been neutralized. This requirement has been the source of one of the biggest disagreements between the DRC and Rwanda since the signing of the deal, as the DRC insists the withdrawal must happen simultaneously with the neutralization of the FDLR.

    Other obstacles to lasting peace include disagreements over the timeline for releasing prisoners and a significant disagreement between the DRC and M23 over whether the latter will withdraw completely from DRC territory and especially from the major city of Goma.

Success for this complex accord remains a long shot, but it has a chance—a better chance than eastern DRC has had for a while. The question now is what can be done to capitalize on this opportunity, given that many past peace deals have floundered after signing and what role can the United States play in the process going forward

    In light of the fact that there is no plausible enforcer of any peace plan in eastern DRC, the only way that peace can hold is if each of the major parties has a strong economic incentive to comply. This is perhaps the most promising part of the peace deal: its economic dimension has the potential to do just that.

    For the DRC, the incentive would be, in part, to regain full sovereign control over its territory and also to begin benefiting from the exploitation of its natural resources, which external powers have exploited for so long. Rwanda need not be cut out of the business either, despite its past actions.

    The United States similarly has a strong incentive to fully develop the region’s economic resources as a way to counter Chinese dominance in rare earth metals, which are crucial raw materials for modern industry. Moreover, for Rwanda, the incentives would have to be powerful enough to rein in M23. The DRC would also need to invest serious effort in fighting its former ally, the FDLR.

    The vision would have to include the creation of a network of mines, refineries and transportation corridors that would give Rwanda a stake in the broader regional development plan and, therefore, a fair share of the eventual profits—at least for a time.

    The basic deal might amount to something like this. Since Rwanda is a stable country with more dependable roads and airports than the DRC, its contribution to the broader set of projects could be ensuring access to this transportation network and initial financial investments.

    The United States and Qatar would also likely provide upfront investment funds. Roads and refineries would be built in the eastern DRC and Rwanda, along with new mines. The outside donors would, in addition, work with Kinshasa to strengthen the training, equipment, logistics and professionalism of the DRC armed forces. That way, the military could eventually do a better job of controlling the east of the DRC than is the case today.

    Speaking purely notionally, this kind of investment agreement might involve, initially, say $10 billion in US funds, $10 billion in other foreign funds, $5 billion from Rwanda and $5 billion from the DRC. Initially, all four groups may gain equal percentages of the profits over, say, a 10-year period. After that, the American and other foreign shares could decline while those of Rwanda and the DRC grow. However, this is merely an illustration of the types of sums of money that might be involved and the kinds of profit-sharing agreements that could be struck.

    The opportunity here is historic. It should not be squandered, even if, as seems likely, there are numerous setbacks and slowdowns along the way.