American Thinker

by Monty Donohew

    Carmon's focus on the enduring power of radical indoctrination is valid. Extremist beliefs are deeply rooted and resilient. Yet his view is overly pessimistic and overlooks how shared economic interests have repeatedly moderated conflict in the Middle East. Even though he doesn't buy into a stark binary, i.e., "Riviera or ideology," he nonetheless downplays prosperity and mutual investment as empirically successful mechanisms for creating new political realities, even among former adversaries.

    History demonstrates that when parties gain a direct stake in peace through finance and security, behavior changes. The Abraham Accords provide the strongest recent proof. Starting in 2020, nations like the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, once aligned with anti-Israel rhetoric, normalized ties with Israel. This led to more than simple diplomatic gestures: direct flights, tech partnerships, tourism booms, energy deals, and billions in trade and investment. Emirati and Bahraini leaders, previously influenced by the same ideological currents, now oversee hotels, tech hubs, and ports that rely on stable relations with Israel. Their citizens encounter Israelis as tourists and business partners, normalizing what was once unthinkable.

    These shifts didn't require abandoning ideology entirely; they recalibrated it because peace proved profitable and secure. Similar patterns hold in Jordan and Egypt, where decades-old peace treaties endure amid turmoil thanks to economic benefits, U.S. aid linked to stability, and military cooperation.

    Trump's approach simply reverses this dynamic. Rather than paying extremists to stay quiet, it invites regional players to invest in Gaza's rebuilding, with commitments to security and deradicalization. The "Riviera" vision isn't a direct bribe to street-level fighters; it's an opportunity for Gulf sovereign funds, Egyptian contractors, Jordanian firms, and moderate Palestinian entrepreneurs to develop hotels, ports, and tech zones they own and profit from. Once capital is committed, these stakeholders have every reason to block rockets or tunnels that threaten their returns.

    This mirrors the Abraham Accords: former enemies became co-investors, turning mutual vulnerability into mutual protection.

    Carmon frames the proposal as naively offering luxury to figures like Yahya Sinwar or Ismail Haniyeh. That's a misreading. The plan, floated by Jared Kushner and others, conditions reconstruction on Hamas's defeat and removal, with governance shifting to entities committed to security and development. Rewards like investment, trade, tourism revenue, and normalized ties aim at pragmatic elites among Palestinians, Arabs, and internationals who can enforce stability.

    These leaders would drive deradicalization: reforming schools, diversifying media, and creating jobs that rival the appeal of martyrdom. Grassroots change takes generations, but it gains traction when former hardliners (like Anwar Sadat, once sympathetic to Nazis, or UAE figures who boycotted Israel) become advocates because their prosperity depends on it.

    Carmon's implied alternative, that ideology must be crushed militarily, with no moderation possible, risks endless cycles of destruction and resurgence. Gaza has been leveled repeatedly, yet Hamas rebuilds. Military victory alone creates vacuums that extremists exploit.

    Incentives, exposure, and shared stakes provide the only viable alternative to destruction. Education shifts when children view Israelis as partners. A Gazan engineer collaborating on a joint tech project with Emirati and Israeli colleagues sees the world anew. Economic opportunity undercuts the narrative that jihad offers the only path to dignity.

    Carmon is correct to highlight the strength of ideology and the irredeemability of some actors. Reform won't be easy to attain, and it will not occur overnight. But he overstates its permanence and undervalues the transformative potential of shared investment. The Abraham Accords showed that even entrenched hostility can evolve when elites gain concrete stakes in peace. Applying that model to Gaza, offering returns, security, and a stable future to those willing to dismantle hate, isn't naive. It's the strategy that has succeeded in the modern Middle East without condemning the region to endless war.

    Carmon is also correct to wonder whether any "alliance" with enemies might alienate friends. Every grand compromise, however, begins with such a concern. Any effort to hard reform is easily dismissed as impossible or dangerous, but reform is no more impossible or dangerous than is acquiescence as an agent of change. The very depth and resilience of ideology demands concerted, coordinated, and equally resilient pressure to reform.

    Dismissing the effort risks perpetuating the very conflict Carmon warns against.