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   Since 2022, Georgia has become one of the most prominent destinations for Russian citizens leaving their country for economic, political and personal reasons. Tbilisi has proved particularly attractive to IT professionals, entrepreneurs, freelancers and people working in the creative industries. The absence of a complicated visa regime, geographical proximity, developed urban infrastructure and the ability to continue working remotely have made Georgia a convenient relocation destination.
   According to research, hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens entered Georgia following the outbreak of hostilities and the announcement of mobilisation in Russia. On September 25 and 26, 2022 alone, 11,143 and 10,804 Russian citizens respectively crossed the Georgian border. Researchers note that the majority of migrants were relatively young, economically independent and well-educated. At the same time, their mass arrival placed significant pressure on the housing market and urban infrastructure.Over time, however, Russian migration has ceased to be merely a socio-economic phenomenon. It has become embedded in the much more complex political context of Georgia itself — and potentially in a broader European context.

Georgia as an Intermediate Space
   Georgia's distinctive position lies in its location between the Russian space and Europe. The country is not a member of the European Union, but it maintains close political and economic ties with the bloc.
The visa-free regime between Georgia and the EU has been in effect since March 28, 2017. Georgian citizens holding biometric passports can enter the Schengen Area without a visa for up to 90 days within any 180-day period.
   The regime does not, by itself, grant the right to work or permanently reside in the EU. It does, however, create significantly easier mobility between Georgia and the European space. This is where a potentially important migration issue emerges. If an individual first establishes legal residence in Georgia and builds a financial, professional and social base there, the next stage of their mobility could be a move to an EU member state through mechanisms provided by European law — including employment, education, family migration, obtaining a visa or applying for international protection.
   For Russian citizens, the situation is more complicated. Following 2022, the EU fully suspended its visa facilitation agreement with Russia. Russian citizens can still apply for Schengen visas, but the process has become more time-consuming and costly, while EU member states have greater scope for individual scrutiny of applicants. As a result, Georgia is objectively acquiring additional significance as a migration space through which individuals can develop longer-term strategies for moving towards Europe.
   This does not mean that Russian citizens automatically gain access to the European labour market or social systems by residing in Georgia. From the perspective of migration planning, however, the existence of a sustainable Russia–Georgia–EU mobility route is a development that European governments have reason to monitor.

From Economic Resource to Social Pressure
   Large-scale migration inevitably affects host societies. As early as 2022, the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) reported a sharp increase in housing demand in Tbilisi following the arrival of citizens from Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. By May 2022, rental prices had risen by 101% year on year.
   Initially, the migration inflow could reasonably be viewed as an economic opportunity. New residents rented apartments, established companies, used local services and spent money in restaurants and shops. Many were financially independent and continued working for foreign companies.
   But the economic effect has a reverse side. Rising rents, competition for employment, changes to the familiar urban environment and growing pressure on infrastructure can gradually become sources of public discontent. Nor are such developments unique to Georgia.
European countries have already experienced the consequences of large-scale migration flows, when concentrations of newcomers in particular cities placed additional pressure on housing, healthcare, education and social services.
For Europe, the issue of Russian relocation through third countries can therefore be viewed not only through a humanitarian or political lens, but also as a matter of migration-risk management.

The Political Dimension
   The political dimension is even more sensitive. In 2023–2024, Tbilisi experienced large-scale protests over legislation concerning the transparency of foreign influence. The law required organisations receiving a significant share of their funding from abroad to register. Georgian authorities argued that the initiative was necessary to increase transparency around foreign financing, while the opposition and Western governments viewed it as a threat to civil society and Georgia's European integration. The protests included clashes between demonstrators and police.
   Against this background, a question naturally arises about the role of sizeable foreign communities, including Russian relocants, in Georgia's political and social life. Here, it is essential to distinguish ordinary migrants from politically active groups. It would be misleading to assume that every Russian citizen who has moved to Georgia is engaged in political activity. Many came primarily for work, personal security or greater individual freedom.
At the same time, the existence of a politically active segment of the Russian diaspora cannot simply be ignored.
Russian citizens in Georgia have participated in anti-war initiatives, civic campaigns and protest actions. For part of Georgian society, this has become an additional source of tension, raising questions about the extent to which foreign citizens should participate in the domestic political affairs of their host country.

Western Funding and the Question of Foreign Influence
   The issue becomes even more sensitive in the context of foreign funding for Georgian civil society. The existence of foreign financing is not a secret. European and other international organisations have supported Georgian NGOs, civic initiatives and development programmes for many years. This is precisely why legislation concerning the transparency of foreign influence has become such a contentious issue. The political debate has produced two fundamentally opposing positions.
On one side, supporters of tighter controls argue that foreign funding can be used to build political infrastructure and influence domestic political processes.
   On the other, opponents of such restrictions argue that international support is an important component of civil-society development. A separate issue concerns the possible use of diaspora communities as communication and mobilisation resources by external political actors. In international politics, diasporas can indeed become channels for disseminating political ideas, mobilising supporters and shaping international narratives.
   However, specific allegations that Russian emigrant communities are being coordinated by foreign governments require evidence on a case-by-case basis, whether concerning an organisation or a particular group.Nevertheless, the potential risk deserves attention — particularly in a country with such a high level of geopolitical sensitivity.

Georgia: European Filter or Transit Platform?
   Ultimately, this is where the most fundamental question lies. Georgia can be viewed as a destination country in its own right. At the same time, it forms part of a broader system of regional mobility that is closely connected to Europe. European countries are already dealing with the migration consequences of Georgian mobility. According to European Commission data, Georgian citizens submitted 14,530 applications for international protection in EU member states in 2024. At the same time, 20,200 Georgian citizens were identified as being illegally present in EU countries, while 17,375 return decisions were issued.
   These figures concern Georgian citizens specifically and do not demonstrate a mass movement of Russian relocants into the EU through Georgia. They do, however, illustrate the scale of an existing migration burden that European authorities already have to manage. The addition of new migration flows could make this system even more complex.
The European debate over Georgia is therefore gradually moving beyond the question of European integration alone. A migration dimension is becoming increasingly important: how sustainable are existing control mechanisms, how can abuse of visa-free arrangements be prevented, and how can ordinary mobility be distinguished from attempts to use transit jurisdictions to circumvent stricter migration procedures?

The Issue Is Not Nationality, but Governance
   Russian emigration to Georgia is not a homogeneous phenomenon. Those who have arrived include entrepreneurs, professionals, families, students, political emigrants and people who view Georgia simply as a temporary stop. It would therefore be wrong to automatically treat all Russian citizens as a risk category. But it would be equally wrong to ignore the political and migration-related consequences of large-scale relocation.
For Georgia, this is ultimately a question of maintaining control over its own social and political environment. For Europe, it is a question of managing external borders, migration flows and mechanisms of international protection.
   Transparency is becoming particularly important: who receives foreign funding; which organisations engage in political activity; which foreign nationals participate in civic campaigns; what resources are used to finance projects; and how channels for subsequent migration to Europe are established.
   Georgia can remain an attractive country for foreign professionals and entrepreneurs. But the state also needs to understand the full cost of large-scale migration — not only its economic benefits, but also its social and political consequences.
   For Europe, the conclusion is even more straightforward: migration risks do not end at the EU's external border. They can develop well before that border is crossed — in countries through which human, financial and political flows move.
This is why Russian relocation to Georgia is of interest not only to Tbilisi. Under certain scenarios, it may become part of a broader European challenge involving migration management, the monitoring of external influence and the resilience of national institutions.