
by Rush Doshi
When U.S. President Donald Trump lands in Shenzhen later this week for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, he will sit down with Chinese leader Xi Jinping for the fourth time amid an unexpected détente between Washington and Beijing. The trade war of 2025 is in abeyance, the two governments have announced a relationship of “constructive strategic stability,” and, to the alarm of American allies, Trump and Xi are planning to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Beneath the surface, however, the détente is beginning to crack.
The relationship between Washington and Beijing looks remarkably different from the way it did a little over a year ago, when the two sides agreed to a truce in Busan, South Korea.In April 2025, Washington initiated the trade war by raising tariffs on China past 140 percent, and Beijing responded by restricting rare-earth exports later that month and threatening another cutoff that October. After Trump promptly backed down, the two leaders reached the deal in Busan: Washington would cap tariffs and suspend a specific export control regulation known as the Affiliates Rule in exchange for Beijing’s suspension of new export controls on minerals and magnets and the resumption of their normal flow to the United States. On that basis, both sides pursued a broad deescalation.
Since then, the Trump administration has been notably accommodating. Washington has kept new tariffs at 12.5 percent, well below the 20-percent ceiling Beijing previously agreed to. It has let advanced AI chips flow to China and to Chinese cutouts in Southeast Asia and has not added a Chinese firm to the Entity List in over the year, the longest pause since 2008. It has withheld arms sales from and downgraded defense talks with Taiwan, cut back naval transits of the Taiwan Strait, and raised doubts about U.S. support in the event of a crisis. And it has offered only muted support to such allies as Japan and the Philippines in the face of escalating Chinese coercion. All the while, Trump has praised Xi as a “great leader” and extended rare courtesies, including by welcoming Xi on the tarmac when he arrived in Washington for a state visit in September, the first such greeting of a foreign leader in 60 years.
Beijing has appreciated this accommodating approach—and seized the opportunity to act more assertively. It has viewed the competitive pause as temporary, a product of China’s growing strength and Trump’s admiration for Xi, and as a way to buy time to build advantage before the next eruption of tensions. With Washington occupied by its war in Iran and humbled by defeat in the last round of the trade war, Beijing has throttled the supply of minerals and magnets to the United States, taken steps to ensure that its industrial and technological gains remain in China, and increased pressure on its neighbors.
So far, Beijing has used the time well, advancing its objectives with little serious pushback from Washington. But China risks overreaching in its relationship with the United States. Not only is an incoming Democratic Congress likely to constrain Trump’s conciliatory China policy. There are also growing frustrations over Beijing’s unwillingness to fulfill the terms agreed to in Busan. Pressure on AI chips and export controls are emerging in the wake of revelations about the Nvidia co-founder Jensen Huang’s relationship with an alleged Chinese spy and his company’s influence over U.S. export control policy. And new U.S. policies in response to the scandal could provoke a response from Beijing.
Xi and Trump will meet in Shenzhen and again in December in Miami, but with the January expiration of the Busan agreement looming in the background (and with no summits planned for next year), time is running out for the two leaders to extend and strengthen the current truce. If the détente falls apart the next time Washington’s and Beijing’s interests clash, China will be better prepared. It may also, perhaps hubristically, be more willing to escalate.
Although China favors Washington’s current accommodating approach and hopes it will last as long as possible, Beijing is also confident that it is strengthening its hand for a more contentious future. For China’s leaders, the current détente has been less an end goal than a temporary intermission, a means to build leverage ahead of the next round of strategic competition and, ultimately, a decisive long-term advantage.
Prominent Chinese scholars see the calm that followed Busan as tactical rather than strategic. Chen Dongxiao, the president of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, told the Shanghai news outlet The Paper that the two countries remain in a “tactical truce.” In May, Wu Xinbo of Fudan University told Beijing News, “If we can achieve a relationship of constructive strategic stability over the next three years, it will extend China’s period of strategic stability and win us time and space for development.” Writing in the journal International Review in August, he declared that the current “tactical stability” was “neither sustainable nor solid.” Shen Weizhong, a former Chinese foreign ministry official, was more blunt: “The more time we have, the better prepared we might be towards a final showdown on Taiwan or maybe another trade war.”
Beijing attributes little of the stabilization to Washington. In his August essay, Wu wrote that it “is not the result of the U.S. side having a change of heart or showing goodwill, but was won by China through arduous striving and struggle.” The United States had no choice; it simply needed the “breathing room.” Wang Yong, the director of Peking University’s American Studies Center, described the trade war as “a tipping point in terms of strength.” The former editor of the Global Times,Hu Xijin, wrote in a Weibo post after the U.S. midterm elections that “the current equilibrium in U.S.-China relations is the result of a contest of strength.” As Wu told The Paper in September, Washington has come to understand that Beijing “needs to be treated equally and with respect” and that China is “bolder about ‘drawing its sword.’” Keeping the supply of rare-earth minerals and magnets tight, to Beijing’s mind, might reinforce the current competitive pause rather than undermine it by reminding American leaders of China’s leverage.
China worries that Trump’s influence will decline over the next two years.
Another critical factor in the current de-escalation, Chinese analysts argue, is Trump’s personality. Trump’s “distinct and unique decision-making style,” as Chen put it, has single-handedly blunted the more forceful defense of U.S. interests that members of his own administration and legislators in both parties favor. “He is often not entirely swayed by bipartisan opposition and still continues to pursue policies based on his own judgment,” Chen explained in the same interview. Writing in the Singaporean paper Lianhe Zaobao in September, Zhao Minghao of Fudan University more pointedly explained that Trump “admires power and prefers to engage with the leaders of powerful countries,” a stabilizing trait that benefits Beijing’s diplomacy while leaving allies and partners on the sidelines. “Of all modern U.S. presidents, Trump has cared the least about Taiwan,” one Guizhou-based commentator wrote. “He would readily sacrifice the island for his own interests.” An article reposted on the website of Qiushi, the Chinese Communist Party’s flagship journal, dwelt on Trump’s decision to greet Xi at the airport when he arrived for his state visit in September. The gesture, it claimed, “reflects the new historical position of China-U.S. relations.”
But China also worries that Trump’s influence will decline over the next two years and perhaps cease altogether after 2028. Wang Hao, a professor at Fudan University’s Center for American Studies, told Phoenix News that the Democratic Party’s approach will not be “as pragmatic and flexible as the Trump administration’s,” a sentiment echoed across Chinese social media after the Democrats’ victory in the midterm elections.
The awareness that Trump’s approach may not survive beyond his presidency is precisely why Beijing has sought to lock it in through diplomacy. According to the Chinese readout, at the summit in May 2026, Xi declared that the relationship of “constructive strategic stability” he and Trump had agreed to build would provide guidance for U.S.-Chinese relations “over the next three years and beyond.” That duration was not accidental. As the scholar Zheng Yongnian put it at the time, the three-year window was “tailor-made for President Trump,” matching his current term. Beijing hopes it will bind his successor.
If diplomacy fails to secure U.S. deescalation, China hopes leverage will succeed. Over the last year, Beijing has used the time and space created by the détente to strengthen its position in industrial and technological competition with the United States. Beijing has long sought to make the world more dependent on China while reducing its own dependence on the world. But over the last year, that approach has evolved. Beijing has unveiled a raft of measures intended to ensure that its industrial, technological, and scientific know-how do not diffuse beyond China’s borders in order to lock in the country’s advantages.
To keep foreign firms in China and blunt Western countries’ leverage over the Chinese economy, the State Council issued Orders 834 and 835, which effectively threaten companies that cut ties with Chinese partners or seek to exit the country with the risk of investigation, exclusion from the Chinese market, exit bans on executives, and possible criminal prosecution. To keep talent in China, Beijing has authorized exit bans on citizens considered possible risks to industrial or technological security and, according to Bloomberg, now requires travel approval for top AI and chip specialists and their families. And to keep scientific discoveries in China, the Ministry of State Security has warned researchers that they must clear security reviews before submitting articles to foreign journals. China has also imposed or proposed new export controls on dozens of technologies, from mining and batteries to AI models and biotechnology in order to protect its industrial capabilities. Beijing has even worked to prevent the transfer of equipment and engineers to India and Southeast Asia, stalled battery ventures with Indian firms, undermined Apple’s effort to move manufacturing to India, and issued a sweeping regulation that subjects Chinese investment abroad to a national security review more expansive than the United States' own outbound investment review.
Beijing’s rare-earth licensing regime exemplifies China’s leverage-building strategy. To obtain a license, foreign buyers must hand over customer lists, the identities of their end users, and images of their production lines, all of which gives China insight into Western dependencies and helps it uncover chokepoints it can squeeze. Beijing has threatened to use these powers against countries that seek to protect themselves from the flood of Chinese manufactured goods entering their markets. In July, Beijing showed how precise it can now be in applying pressure when it cut off 14 European firms, including the German arms maker Rheinmetall, from Chinese dual-use exports in retaliation for EU sanctions related to Chinese support of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
If diplomacy fails to secure U.S. deescalation, China hopes leverage will succeed.
Beijing has paired these measures at home with escalating pressure campaigns in its near abroad, betting that a distracted and chastened Washington will not come to the aid of China’s neighbors. That campaign has been most brazen in the South China Sea, where China has engaged in escalations unseen before the détente. Since Busan, Beijing has essentially abrogated its 2024 understanding with the Philippines, which maintained stability on the question of Second Thomas Shoal. In July, a Chinese coast guard boat rammed a Philippine navy inflatable and its crew clubbed a sailor on the head with a wooden baton, the most violent assault on Philippine personnel in years.
The timing of these incidents has been provocative. In July, when Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio were in Manila for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations meetings, the coast guard launched water-cannon attacks on Philippine vessels near Scarborough Shoal. Then, in September, during Xi’s U.S. state visit, Chinese warships and cutters blocked a Philippine resupply mission outright for the first time in two years. In October, Chinese cutters interfered with a medical evacuation from Second Thomas Shoal, delaying a patient transfer by ten hours. Last month, Beijing’s ambassador in Manila mused that if China chose to use force against the Philippines, “we may easily win.”
China has also run its broadest coercion campaign against Japan in more than a decade, nominally in response to comments made by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on Taiwan. It has included a travel advisory, a seafood ban, a dual-use export ban, and curbs on rare-earth exports that have forced Japanese companies to contemplate shutting down operations. Chinese carrier-based fighters have locked their weapons-targeting radar onto Japanese jets. Beijing has also pursued new gas structures in the East China Sea and set a record 357-day coast guard presence in 2025 around the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands (known in China as the Diaoyu Islands), with cutters now chasing Japanese fishing boats into territorial waters. Washington’s support for Tokyo has, so far, been limited.
Beijing likely believes it is better off now than it was when the truce began.
And around Taiwan, China has made its pressure quieter but more routine. In December 2025, during the People’s Liberation Army’s Justice Mission exercises, China fired live rockets closer to Taiwan than ever before, landing ten of them inside the island’s 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone. As of this summer, Beijing has reduced air incursions, but coast guard activity around Taiwan’s outlying islands has become routinized. And since June, Beijing has run standing “law enforcement patrols” east of Taiwan, asserting jurisdiction over the waters Taipei would need in a blockade.
Outside of Asia, Beijing has sought to take advantage of anger, particularly in the developing world, at the Trump administration’s “Liberation Day” tariffs and the Iran war. Before traveling to Washington, Xi made a point of stopping in several capitals: he toured Bishkek and Cairo, and attended the BRICS summit in New Delhi, stressing that China, not the United States, is now the steadier partner.
Beijing has reason to think this approach is working. It rightly judged that Washington would prioritize keeping the détente alive over responding to its provocations. A year after Busan, China holds a tighter grip on critical supply chains, has set new precedents in Asia, and faces an adversary in Washington that has grown used to holding back. Beijing likely believes it is better off now than it was when the truce began.
What looks like success now, however, may still prove to be overreach. In addition to rare earths and magnets, several important questions went unresolved in past U.S.-Chinese summits and are likely to resurface in this week’s summit in Shenzhen, including China’s anticipated purchases of Boeing aircraft and agricultural products, AI safety, and the United States’ suspension of arms sales to Taiwan. But the most important question is what will become of the current trade truce.
The United States has complied with the terms of the Busan agreement, suspending the Affiliates Rule and lowering tariffs, but Beijing has throttled the supply of rare-earth minerals and magnets to the United States. U.S. officials say China has delivered only about two-thirds of what it promised, and trade data suggest the shortfall is larger still. The administration believes Beijing’s noncompliance is deliberate. Anecdotal evidence from American business leaders in regular touch with the Ministry of Commerce confirms the administration’s assessment that Beijing seeks to keep a tight leash on rare-earth minerals and will occasionally “yank the chain” on individual companies in response to any perceived slight by Washington.
From the U.S. perspective, the very point of the Busan negotiations was to avoid this situation. Indeed, the U.S. fact sheet at Busan indicated that China agreed to issue general licenses for a number of rare earths and other critical minerals to American end users and their suppliers worldwide; case-by-case licenses, which could be delayed by Beijing, would not be required. China has not denied making that commitment, and a few weeks after the summit, the Ministry of Commerce began issuing a new category of general licenses to magnet makers. But Beijing’s licenses have been narrow and firm specific, and American industry continues to face enormous challenges in securing certain rare earths, notably yttrium and scandium.
U.S. officials say China has delivered only about two-thirds of the rare earths it promised.
Beijing’s intention may not be to undermine the Busan agreement but, paradoxically, to strengthen it. In keeping with its belief that strength begets American conciliation, China’s strategy appears to be to occasionally impose shortages to remind Washington of the leverage that Beijing continues to enjoy. But the tactic is beginning to backfire. Shortages of yttrium, used for jet engines and gas turbines, have forced some suppliers to suspend production. Chipmakers are running short of scandium. All of this strengthens the arguments of those who believe Beijing never intended to honor Busan and that the United States should begin to walk away from the agreement. If Washington concludes that China will weaponize rare earths no matter what the United States does, the case for American restraint may fall apart, and with it the détente that has bought Beijing the time it prizes.
Tensions are also mounting in other areas. Each side is increasingly frustrated with the other’s unilateral economic measures and restrictions on technology, particularly those that were not addressed in Busan: for Beijing, U.S. import controls, outbound investment regimes, and licensing backlogs; for Washington, Chinese export controls and State Council directives. A Democratic Congress is less likely to countenance Trump’s China policy and more likely to pursue investigations into China’s espionage and influence efforts and potential malfeasance at the Department of Commerce. The explosive controversy around Huang and Nvidia has the potential to inject fresh tensions into the relationship, particularly on matters related to AI and export controls. The Department of Commerce has already issued a new interim final rule to stop Chinese firms from smuggling chips into China or remotely accessing American AI chips in Southeast Asian data centers. Administration officials insist that closing a loophole China itself claims not to use “should not be something that generates countermeasures.” But Beijing may well retaliate before the rule takes effect in February.
These headwinds make breakthroughs in Shenzhen on purchases, artificial intelligence, nuclear weapons, or Iran less likely. With the truce, extended last week by just two months, set to formally expire on January 10, the summit is one of the last opportunities for Trump and Xi to reach even a modest declaration that they are working to extend the terms set out in Busan and will aim to conclude negotiations in December, when Xi comes to Miami for the G-20 summit.
If China were to continue to throttle rare-earth minerals and magnets, and a January breakdown did come to pass, the two sides might find themselves in another round of escalation. Xi may arrive at the two upcoming summits holding a stronger hand than he did in Busan. But his actions are gradually producing a counterpart with less room—and perhaps less reason—to keep folding.

Mr.BadGuy
Publisher
Mr.BadGuy
Publisher
These soldiers are from a country whose president is a Jew Zelensky. Orthodox churches are also being destroyed in this country. Synagogues are not touched. Surprisingly, it turns out that Jews get along well with the Bandera Nazis.