National Interest

 

by John McLaughlin

    Growing Russian dissatisfaction with the war in Ukraine and Kyiv’s operational successes could finally bring Moscow to the bargaining table.

    We have for several weeks been seeing a flood of reports asserting that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s support among the Russian elite and the public is waning. These coincide with news of widespread alarm in Russia about the increasing number of successful Ukrainian strikes deep inside the country, including in Moscow.

    This conjunction of events holds new opportunities for the United States and Europe, especially if they can organize themselves to exploit the weaknesses in Putin’s current military strategy, which relies heavily on missile strikes that, with the right defenses, can be neutralized. The news out of the NATO summit is a promising step in that direction—especially President Donald Trump’s pledge to grant Ukraine a licensing arrangement to produce Patriot missile interceptors.

    Regarding dissatisfaction with Putin’s Russia, the most recent sign is an extensive interview in The Economist with Russia’s most prominent industrialist, “fertilizer king” Andrey Melnichenko. His decision to speak out is as striking as the grim scenarios he sketches for Russia if the war drags on and nothing changes domestically. He carefully avoids calling for regime change but assesses that, without policies that focus more on citizens’ welfare and present a more predictable, less hostile face to the world, Russia could descend into chaos or into a kind of powerless vassal relationship with China or the West.

    This follows an earlier essay in The Economist by an anonymous former senior official in the Russian government. Without predicting a near-term collapse of Putin’s regime, “Anonymous” alleges that Russians are starting to “imagine a future without him.” The writer says there are many causes, including the growing cost of a war Russia is not winning. But the main idea is that Russian elites are seeing their gains from loyalty melt away and that Russians generally feel they are experiencing “repression without purpose.” The government’s attempt to expropriate billions in assets from the country’s most prominent agricultural businessman, arrested in March 2025, surely fuels this feeling.

    Similar reports also filter through publications claiming to have well-placed official sources in Russia. Medusa, an outlet operated from Latvia by dissident Russian journalists, cites sources in the presidential administration, the legislature and regional governments who say they were disappointed that the war did not end in 2024. They are “fatigued” from the war and think Putin has no clear post-war vision.

    Balancing this to an extent is a sizable group that expresses dissatisfaction differently. They want to prosecute the war more aggressively. They are not against the war but are frustrated by the lack of manpower and materiel. They favor a further mobilization and putting the country on even more of a war footing—and by implication are also deeply dissatisfied with Putin’s management of the conflict.

    Probably nothing has sparked more widespread anger in Russia than the regime’s banning of the Telegram app and its tight restrictions on the internet. These are among the few outlets for relatively free expression and access to outside information, while making everyday activities more convenient in a society full of stress. Some Russians fear such restrictions are “preparing them for a North Korea-like model” of the internet.

    Public opinion is always difficult to gauge in Russia. However, the most reliable of available surveys confirm the overall direction sketched by “Anonymous” and independent journalists who still have a reach into Russia. The relatively independent Levada Center polls show support for the war falling to its lowest level, at 24 percent, even though support for the military itself and for an outcome favorable to Russia remain high. Another survey, this one by a polling company that works for the Kremlin, reportedly shows the lowest confidence in Putin since 2022.

    How does the ground situation in the war play into all of this  Much Western opinion leans to the view that the momentum has shifted in Ukraine’s favor. Ukraine is faring better for sure, but the narrative of shifting momentum oversimplifies the situation.

    No doubt the mood in Russia has been darkened by Ukraine’s ability to reach deeply and destructively into Russia with advanced drones, as such attacks have knocked offline about 20 percent of Russia’s refining capacity. But experts tracking territorial gains and losses offer conflicting estimates, with some citing sizable Russian losses and others reporting modest gains.

    A key reason for this is that infiltration tactics on both sides have created a fluctuating gray zone on the ground and broken the traditional concept of a front line; if you count infiltrated territory as held (as Russia and some experts do), it looks like a gain, even though it may be temporary. If you count Russian infiltration as a loss for Ukraine (as Kyiv does), you get a different picture.

    Looking at data for the last three months, neither side has demonstrated the capacity to change the map at strategic scale. Nevertheless, Ukraine is gaining a strategic advantage by adding to the economic and political pressures on Russia while enduring what looks like a see-sawing situation on the ground—one that is aggravated by a manpower shortage likely to become a greater vulnerability if Putin can keep the war going long enough.

    From a purely military basis, we are unlikely to see a decisive breakthrough by either side anytime soon.

    So, what does it all mean  Has anything really changed  After all, those who are losing confidence in Putin or are fed up with the war say Putin is likely to survive. And there is no certainty that Russian forces stalled in Ukraine are in danger of being decisively defeated. It is tempting to say that we are just passing through another transient episode and that by the autumn we’ll be back to what is often called “static fighting” with no end in sight.

    Still, it is just possible that four years later we have reached an inflection point of sorts. Its major quality could be something important and new in Russia: a sense that the downsides of repressive measures have begun to outweigh the benefits.

    It’s not clear whether such grievances are close to critical mass—that is, the point where a leader’s support simply and suddenly collapses. Weighing against that is the powerful repressive apparatus that Putin commands to detect and neutralize dissent. In political analysis, the hardest thing to gauge with confidence is the moment when incremental change—what I think we are detecting in Russia—reaches critical mass and triggers a decisive shift. When we are surprised that such shifts occur, it’s usually because they’re nearly impossible to predict with precision.

    Putin has shown in the past—and again right now—that his response to slack support in Russia is to escalate in Ukraine. He does this by increasing bomb, missile and drone attacks on Ukraine. He does this to manufacture, for his domestic audience, a show that appears to win. So, if there is an opportunity here for American policy, it is the potential to frustrate Putin’s ability to do that.

    The two critical ingredients for such a US strategy are increased air defense for Ukraine, coupled with enhanced medium-range strike capability to help neutralize the means by which Putin carries out his attacks.

    Helping Ukraine has, of course, been the standard assessment for ending the war, so this is not a novel idea. But what is novel is the unique conjunction of all these factors—Putin’s domestic troubles, his need for spectacle, the unresolved situation on the ground. Combined, these create an especially propitious moment for Western action. Now is the time for the United States and Europe to make a maximum effort to enhance Ukraine’s most critical tools. This holds the greatest promise to frustrate Putin’s current strategy and feed dissatisfaction in Russia with his performance.

    Ukrainian air defense deserves the highest priority and the Patriot system is still the gold standard. These systems, of course, are expensive—about $1 billion per system and $4 million per missile—and in short supply. Ukraine currently operates eight systems, procured via the United States, Germany and the Netherlands. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky says he needs 25 for adequate coverage.

    Trump’s pledge to grant Ukraine a long-sought production licensing agreement is welcome news in Kyiv. This is strategically significant, but mainly as a political signal of US support; it will not have an immediate operational impact on the 2026 interceptor crisis, where expenditure during intensive attack periods runs at an estimated 100 interceptors per month. Moreover, it was not immediately clear whether Trump was referring only to interceptor missiles, to the broader Patriot system, or to some other kind of production in Ukraine, Europe, or both.

    Then, there is the sheer complexity of producing the entire system, which involves integrating components made by at least three corporations—Lockheed, RTX and Boeing —with some parts requiring more time than others to produce and integrate (a problem that contributes to lag in final assembly).

    This almost certainly means that the gap between now and any Ukrainian production line will still have to be covered by transfers, allied purchases and triage. Speeding up production and/or rounding up about 17–18 Patriots from the 19 operating countries would be a formidable challenge for US industry and diplomacy—and for Ukraine’s defense industrial base—but not insurmountable.

    If President Trump is looking for impact, it is hard to imagine a more consequential achievement in today’s international arena than getting this done.

    We should have no illusion that even this would cause Putin to renounce his aims in Ukraine or trigger regime change in Russia. But it could deepen his dilemmas, narrow his options and tip the scales toward getting him to the bargaining table in search of a face-saving endgame. Then it would be over to diplomacy—American, European, or a combination—for the equally challenging task of guaranteeing Ukraine’s territorial integrity in the future through deterrence and security guarantees.